Foresight Bias in Patent Law by Seymore, Sean B.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 90 | Issue 3 Article 4
2-1-2015
Foresight Bias in Patent Law
Sean B. Seymore
Vanderbilt University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons, and the Psychology and Psychiatry Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean B. Seymore, Foresight Bias in Patent Law, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1105 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol90/iss3/4
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 1  2-MAR-15 14:16
FORESIGHT  BIAS  IN  PATENT  LAW
Sean B. Seymore*
ABSTRACT
Much of patent reform has focused on efforts to make it harder to obtain and enforce low-
quality patents.  The most straightforward way to achieve this goal is to raise the substantive
standards of patentability.  What is often ignored in discussions about raising patentability stan-
dards is that high-quality inventions can slip through the cracks.  What is more troubling is that
sometimes this happens because of bias.  This Article draws attention to foresight bias, which
occurs when a decision-maker lets over-pessimism and an oversimplified view of the future influ-
ence the patentability determination.  Foresight bias leads to a patent denial regardless of the
invention’s technical merit.  Particularly susceptible are inventions emerging from “unpredict-
able” fields like chemistry and biotechnology—things like chemical compounds and DNA frag-
ments.  If the invention’s principal purpose is to serve as a “building block” for something else, it
is unpatentable.  The fear is that a patent could create a monopoly of knowledge and impede
future research.  Empirical studies, however, suggest that these fears have largely not material-
ized.  More importantly, the patent denial costs the inventor, society, and the patent system.
This Article offers a solution to this problem.  It proposes a new paradigm that gauges the
patentability of building block inventions in unpredictable fields objectively without reliance on
the utility requirement—the principal conduit for foresight bias.  Its implementation will promote
disclosure, foster more creative activity, reduce wasteful duplicative research efforts, and promote
technological progress—all important objectives of the patent system.  Eliminating the bias will
also reconnect the patent system to many of the technical communities that it serves.
INTRODUCTION
Patent reform has been the subject of much scholarship and debate over
the past decade.1  Calls for reform have been prompted by concerns that the
© 2015 Sean B. Seymore.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
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1 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008); DAN L. BURK &
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004).
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) routinely grants poor-qual-
ity patents2 and that such patents are too easy to obtain and enforce.3  Con-
gress took a step toward addressing these concerns through its recent passage
of the America Invents Act.4
Much attention in the patent reform debate has focused on the substan-
tive standards for patentability.5  Many commentators have long argued that
the standards are too low, thereby diminishing their gatekeeping function.6
This argument deserves attention because adjusting these standards is consid-
ered the principal tool for modulating the scope, number, and quality of
issued patents.7  Indeed, tightening the standards of patentability has been a
major goal of judicial efforts at patent reform.8  Scholars and policymakers
all seem to believe that raising the standards could do much to ameliorate
many problems afflicting the patent system.9  For instance, if the standards
are sufficiently high, patents would be harder to obtain and easier to
invalidate.10
There is, however, another side to the story.  What is often ignored in
discussions about raising patentability standards is that meritorious inven-
2 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1496 n.3 (2001) (describing the push for examiners to issue patents irrespective of
quality); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (exploring criticisms).  A poor quality patent is one that is likely
invalid because it fails to meet basic patentability standards or has overly broad claims.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003).
3 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 175–76.
4 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).  The landmark legislation seeks to “improve
patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.” H.R. REP.
NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
5 The conditions for patentability are found in Title 35 of the U.S. Code.  In short,
the claimed invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable sub-
ject matter.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).  In addition, the patent application must ade-
quately describe, enable, and set forth the best mode contemplated for carrying out the
invention and conclude with claims that delineate the invention with particularity.  35
U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b).
6 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 162–63 (exploring the decline in patent
quality and attributing the weakening of patentability standards to the Federal Circuit);
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 11, 201 (same).
7 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 142 (using the biotechnology industry to
demonstrate the benefits of tailored standards).
8 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (holding that claims relating to a
method of hedging risks are unpatentable); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsis-
tency with the “expansive and flexible approach” set forth in Supreme Court precedent).
Here it is worth noting that patentability standards evolve primarily through judicial rather
than legislative action. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90
B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010).
9 See sources cited supra note 1.
10 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 175.
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tions can slip through the cracks.  A denial will deprive the inventor of a
patent; however, high standards will also reduce the number of applications
filed.  When this happens, society is deprived of the public disclosure of tech-
nical information about the invention that occurs once a patent document
publishes.11  Thus, this paradigm compromises the patent system’s primary
goal to promote technological progress.12  Any patentability standard that
produces this outcome should give decision-makers considerable pause.
What is more troubling is that sometimes this occurs because of bias in
the patentability determination.  The type of bias most frequently discussed
in patent law is hindsight bias—also known as “Monday morning
quarterbacking.”13  Hindsight bias is the cognitive limitation which prevents
persons from disregarding their knowledge of an outcome in assessing past
events.14  It can creep into the patentability calculus anytime a retrospective
analysis is required.  The classic example is nonobviousness, the statutory
requirement that prevents the patenting of inventions that are trivial
advances over what is already known.15  The question that must be answered
is whether the invention that is now claimed would have been obvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)16 at the time the patent
application was filed.17  Attempting to elucidate what the PHOSITA knew or
could have done raises hindsight concerns because “decision-makers uncon-
sciously let knowledge of the invention bias their conclusion concerning
11 See discussion infra Section III.A (first paragraph).
12 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 876 (1988).
13 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 571 (1998).
14 John C. Anderson et al., Evaluations of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the
Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 711 (1993) (“Hindsight bias relates to individu-
als’ overestimation of the extent to which a realized outcome could have been antici-
pated.”); Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 292
(1975).
15 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); see also infra subsection II.B.2.
16 The person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) is a hypothetical construct
of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent person in torts.  Factors relevant to construct-
ing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include “(1) the educational level of the
inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technol-
ogy; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.”  Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union
Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
17 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).  Nonobviousness is a question of law based on the following
pertinent underlying facts: (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; (3) the PHOSITA’s level of
skill; and (4) secondary considerations which provide objective proof of nonobviousness,
such as the invention’s commercial success.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1966).
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whether the invention was obvious in the first instance.”18  As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)19 has noted, “ ‘[t]hat
which may be made clear and thus ‘obvious’ [today], with the invention fully
diagrammed and aided . . .’ by experts in the field, ‘may have been a break-
through of substantial dimension when first unveiled.’”20  Courts are aware
of the hindsight effect21 and try to fight it.22  Scholars have written exten-
sively about hindsight bias in the nonobviousness realm23 and in other areas
of patent law.24
This Article, however, focuses on another type of bias, which has been
largely overlooked in the academic literature but has important implications
for patent law and policy.  It is foresight bias, which occurs (as defined in this
Article) when a decision-maker lets over-pessimism and an oversimplified
view of the future bias the patentability determination.25  This is related to
the tendency of decision-makers to be risk averse because they overweigh the
18 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006).
19 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has jurisdiction
over appeals from the Patent Office and district court cases arising under the patent laws.
The court was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
20 Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting
Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
21 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (noting that
factfinders should be aware of the “distortion” caused by hindsight bias); Graham, 383 U.S.
at 36 (instructing courts to “‘guard against slipping into use of hindsight’” (quoting
Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckerthorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir.
1964))); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the importance of
“casting the mind back to the time of invention” to avoid the “‘insidious effect of a hind-
sight syndrome wherein that which only the invention taught is used against its teacher’”
(quoting In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
22 See Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining
that the inventor’s objective evidence of nonobviousness can “enable the court to avert the
trap of hindsight” (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. ITC, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010))).
23 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: Patent
Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41
(2012); Mandel, supra note 18.
24 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1199 (2002) (enablement); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries,
108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 573 (2010) (claim interpretation); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 41–42 (2009)
(enablement); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 943
(2011) (novelty).
25 Foresight bias has a similar definition in psychology, where it is said to “result[ ]
from a shallow perception of history” which “manifests itself in . . . over-confidence (and
sometimes over-pessimism) and an over-simplified view of the future.”  R. Bradley MacKay
& Peter McKiernan, The Role of Hindsight in Foresight: Refining Strategic Reasoning, 36
FUTURES 161, 165 (2004).  The result is “logical (and structural) path-dependencies, faulty
reasoning and, ultimately, a poor understanding of the future.” Id.
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likelihood of bad outcomes.26  Foresight bias leads to a patent denial despite
the invention’s technical merit and ability to further the patent system’s pri-
mary goals—namely to promote technological progress through the dissemi-
nation of knowledge, coordinate the future development of technology, and
spur additional inventive activity.  What is particularly troubling about fore-
sight bias is that it can lead to predictions about patenting that are simply
wrong.27
Foresight bias in patent law manifests itself primarily through the utility
requirement.28  It is codified in § 101 of the patent statute, which states in
relevant part that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent.”29
A requirement for utility appeared in the original Patent Act of 179030 and
has remained a part of the statutory scheme.31
26 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 341, 343–45 (1984) (describing the cognitive phenomenon); see also Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659–61
(1998) (describing the phenomenon of overpessimism); cf. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADE-
OFFS 104 (1992) (suggesting that people overestimate low probability risks).
27 Consider Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), where the Supreme Court
had to determine whether a genetically engineered bacterium constituted patent-eligible
subject matter.  The Patent Office and several amici argued against eligibility because pat-
enting genetic research would lead to a “parade of horribles” that could “pose a serious
threat to the human race,” including “[the] spread [of] pollution and disease[,] . . . a loss
of genetic diversity, and . . . [a] practice [that] may tend to depreciate the value of human
life.” Id. at 316.  Writing for the majority, Justice Burger declined the invitation to bring
fear of the unknown into the patentability calculus. Id.  As he saw it, “[w]hether respon-
dent’s claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the
hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all.” Id. at 317.  Needless to say,
these fears were not realized; indeed, Chakrabarty spawned the modern biotechnology
industry. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
78 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining that Chakrabarty was “extremely important for the then-nas-
cent biotechnology industry because it established that the fruits of the industry’s
research . . . would be eligible for patenting”); Albert Gore, Jr. & Steve Owens, The Chal-
lenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 336, 339 (1985) (describing how Chakrabarty
spurred investment in biotechnology).
28 The requirement for utility applies to utility patents (also known as patents for
invention), which cover any new or improved “process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  Utility patents are the most common type of
patent and the focus of this Article.  The U.S. patent system grants two other types of
patents: design patents, which protect any “new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture,” 35 U.S.C. § 171, and plant patents, which protect any “distinct and
new variety of plant.”  35 U.S.C. § 161.
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
30 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793) (“[U]pon the petition
of any person or persons . . . that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not
before known or used . . . it shall and may be lawful . . . to cause letters patent to be made
out.” (emphasis added)).
31 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318 (repealed 1836) (“[Appli-
cants must allege they have] invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
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But what does it mean to be useful?  Congress has provided no insight
into its meaning.32  The abstract and imprecise nature of the term invites
subjective interpretations because virtually everything can be used by someone
for something.33  The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term simply as
“beneficial”34 or “fitness for some desirable purpose or valuable end.”35
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the standard for utility in patent
law was also de minimis.  Some beneficial use was sufficient to establish utility
unless the invention was inoperable or detrimental to the public interest.36
It was believed that a low utility threshold promoted knowledge dissemina-
tion and the disclosure function of the patent system.37
But this changed in the middle of the twentieth century when utility
took on an invigorated role in patent law.  By this time the invention land-
scape had changed from primarily mechanical devices to one increasingly
populated with chemical and pharmaceutical inventions.38  How to adapt the
utility requirement to accommodate this new landscape led to conflicts
among judges on the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.),39 tension between the C.C.P.A. and the Patent Office,40 and
sharp ideological disagreements among Supreme Court Justices.41  The end
result was a ratcheted-up standard, which now requires that the inventor’s
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement”); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357,
§ 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870) (identical language); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24,
16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952) (same).
32 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
345 (2002) (noting that congressional inaction has led to the difficulty in defining the
term “useful”).
33 Even a failed experiment is useful because it eliminates whatever approach was
under consideration, makes way for an alternative, and always produces data from which
others can learn. See NEIL BALDWIN, EDISON: INVENTING THE CENTURY 51 (1995) (quoting
Thomas Edison’s remarks to financial supporters that “[n]o experiments are useless”); see
also Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2012) (proposing the
creation of nonexclusionary patent documents known as “null patents” which would dis-
seminate technical information harvested from failed experiments).
34 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 356 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “useful”).
35 Id. at 368 (defining “utility”).
36 See infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
37 A low utility standard “encourage[s] inventors of new [products and] processes to
publicize the event for the benefit of the entire scientific community, thus widening the
search for uses and increasing the fund of scientific knowledge.”  Brenner v. Manson, 383
U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
38 See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 263–69
(1990).
39 The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III court on the same level as the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.  It was abolished by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. See supra note
19.
40 See infra Section I.B.
41 See infra Section I.B.
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assertions be credible42 and that the invention possess “specific” and “sub-
stantial” utility.43
The crucial link between foresight bias and utility has largely escaped
the attention of legal scholars.  This inattention is somewhat understandable
because utility—the principal conduit for foresight bias—is often assumed to
be a “low bar to patentability”44 or a “nonexistent” patentability require-
ment.45  This statement is inaccurate.  The utility requirement is now a pow-
erful gatekeeper that allows the Patent Office and the courts to subjectively
decide when or if something can be patented.46  The lack of objective criteria
for utility opens the door for all sorts of mischief in patent law.47
Foresight bias is most prominent in assessing the patentability of “build-
ing block” inventions from “unpredictable” fields like chemistry and biotech-
nology.48  Those seeking to claim things like chemical compounds and DNA
fragments can face formidable utility hurdles.49  If the invention’s purpose is
to serve as a building block for something else, it cannot be patented because
it lacks a specific and substantial utility.50  The fear is that a patent on these
types of building blocks could create a monopoly of knowledge and inhibit
future research.51  By comparison, the utility of other types of building
42 In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
43 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (construing “useful” in 35
U.S.C. § 101 to require “substantial” and “specific” utility); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining the terms).
44 Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58
(2011) (noting that inventions failing to meet the current standard are rare).
45 Id.; see also Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59
ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007) (“The utility requirement is still properly understood as
very low and generally presents a low bar to patentability.”).
46 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2000) (“Another possible way of understanding the
utility requirement is as a timing device, helping to identify when an invention is ripe for
patent protection.”).
47 See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1514–22 (2011)
(describing how bias led to decades of denials for a lack of utility for patent applications
disclosing and claiming therapeutics for successfully treating baldness and cancer, despite
objective evidence to the contrary, until the Patent Office and the courts became con-
vinced that these were credible undertakings).
48 Patent law regards experimental sciences like chemistry and biotechnology as
“unpredictable” because PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot predict outcomes with a
reasonable expectation of success.  On the other hand, inventions in applied technologies
like electrical and mechanical engineering are often regarded as “predictable” arts because
they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. See discussion infra Section I.A.
49 Here it is worth noting that DNA-related inventions can face formidable patentabil-
ity hurdles aside from utility. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (holding that claims directed to isolated DNA sequences
recite products of nature and, thus, are not patent-eligible subject matter).
50 See infra Section I.C.
51 See infra Section I.B.
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blocks—things like bricks, steel beams, and software modules—is never
questioned.52
To better understand the problem, consider the following hypothetical.
Many pharmaceutical companies have been on a quest to invent a choles-
terol-lowering blockbuster drug53 to match or exceed the success of Lip-
itor—the best-selling drug of all time.54  In 2006, scientists discovered that a
compound found in dandelions lowers cholesterol in humans without side
effects.  But the pharmaceutical companies ran into a roadblock when they
set out to make compounds that mimic this activity.  The structural backbone
of the dandelion compound is a molecular knot—a complex assemblage of
interlocking molecular fragments—that is nearly impossible to replicate in
the laboratory.55  Leading organic chemists from around the world agreed
that it could not be done.  But in early 2013, after spending $1.6 billion in
research and development, an AcmePharma chemist invented a molecular
knot (X) very similar in structure to the one found in the dandelion com-
pound.  Early experiments reveal that X is a suitable building block for larger
compounds.
When AcmePharma files a patent application, the Patent Office deter-
mines that X and the process by which it is made are unpatentable under
§ 101 for a lack of utility.56  The Patent Office takes the position that a patent
would allow AcmePharma to create a “monopoly of knowledge”57 which
could “engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area”58 and poten-
tially “block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
benefit to the public.”59  This pessimistic projection is the hallmark of fore-
sight bias.60
Yet this view is shortsighted.  What is overlooked is that while X’s value to
society might seem small ex ante, the breakthrough does benefit society
immediately by catalyzing more creative activity, spawning new areas of tech-
nology, and enriching the public storehouse of knowledge.61  But rendering
X unpatentable at this early stage delays or forecloses these possibilities.
AcmePharma has every incentive to keep the technical details about X secret
52 See infra Section I.A.
53 The pharmaceutical industry defines a blockbuster drug as one that generates at
least $1 billion in annual revenue. RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 25 (2007).
54 Lipitor had peak annual sales of $13 billion before the patent expired in November
2011.  Jonathan D. Rockoff, Goodbye, Lipitor. Pfizer Bids a Farewell, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2012,
at B1.
55 See generally Christiane Dietrich-Buchecker et al., Molecular Knots, 249 TOPICS IN CUR-
RENT CHEMISTRY 261 (2005).
56 See supra text accompanying note 29; infra Section I.C.
57 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
58 Id.
59 Id. (footnote omitted).
60 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
61 See discussion infra Section III.A.
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unless and until it develops a Lipitor replacement.62  Of course, had
AcmePharma known about X’s unpatentability ex ante, it might not have
pursued the $1.6 billion project in the first place.63  Either outcome costs
society and frustrates both the economic and innovation-related goals of the
patent system.64
This Article offers a solution to this problem.  It proposes that building
blocks should be patentable—regardless of whether a use is disclosed.  I
argue that concerns about patent breadth and technical merit can be
addressed through compliance with (or more rigorous enforcement of)
enablement and nonobviousness—two patentability requirements that
(unlike utility) are assessed through objective, fact-based inquiries.  Remov-
ing utility from the patentability calculus would essentially eliminate foresight
bias in unpredictable fields like chemistry and biotechnology and be a win-
win-win for the patentee, society, and the patent system.  The patentee could
exploit the building block and recoup research and development expendi-
tures.65  Society would get the benefits that flow from the invention’s disclo-
sure, namely the addition of technical information about the invention to the
public storehouse of knowledge (which, in turn, would prevent duplicative
research efforts and foster more creative activity during the patent term).66
The patent system would fulfill its goals of promoting technological progress,
deterring secrecy, and preserving the incentives to invent and disclose.67
This Article is the first to take a hard look at foresight bias in patent law.  It is
62 See infra Section III.A.
63 Professor Robert Merges has argued that patentability standards affect research and
development (R&D) decisions involving risky research projects:
Detailed case studies show that almost every firm at least tries to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of proposed research and development projects.  R&D managers
also consider “patentability” or “patent strength” prior to investing in R&D
projects.  Thus the prospect of getting a patent may enter into the initial project
investment or selection choice.  If so, the standard of patentability enters at this
stage.  Even for firms whose research proceeds further before making a detailed
cost/benefit analysis, patentability might enter in the very rough (and sometimes
implicit) economic feasibility decisions made by the R&D department at the out-
set of the research project.
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10–12
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
64 See infra Part III.
65 See infra note 376.
66 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009).  As Judge Giles
Rich once explained, “even if [the invention] does not go into the public domain during
the patent term, the public gets the advantage of knowing what the invention is and how to
practice it.”  Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 895, 900 (1999)
(quoting Email from Judge Giles S. Rich, Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, to Professor Janice M. Mueller, Associate Professor, The John Marshall
Law School (Aug. 16, 1997)).
67 See infra notes 376–78 and accompanying text.
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part of a larger project to bridge the disconnect between patent law and
science.68
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the
emergence of building block inventions from fields like chemistry and bio-
technology onto the patent landscape and further explores the development
and application of foresight bias.  Part II begins by making the normative
case for the patentability of building blocks.  It then describes how concerns
about patent scope and patent-worthiness should be addressed through
enablement and nonobviousness rather than utility.  Implementing this pro-
posal will eliminate foresight bias in the unpredictable arts.  Part III describes
how the proposal promotes the policy objectives of the patent system, and
responds to potential criticisms.
I. THE BUILDING BLOCK CONUNDRUM
A. The Problem of Scale
In common usage, a “building block” is something that can be used to
make something bigger—like a brick used to make a wall.69  Similarly in pat-
ent law, a building block invention is one that can be used to make some-
thing else.70  Of course, the universe of potential building block inventions is
infinite—anything from chemical compounds to gene fragments to nano-
tubes to bricks.  The common thread shared by all building blocks—regard-
less of the nature of the technology—is that their principal usefulness is the
structural role they perform in creating the bigger thing.
Yet, patent law treats building blocks differently depending on the
nature of the underlying technology.  Some are patentably useful and some
are not.  Things like bricks, steel beams, and software modules—macroscale
inventions—easily satisfy § 101 because they have a “well-established” util-
68 See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (proposing a new
approach for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies which, by
requiring applicants to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity
between patent law and the experimental sciences); Seymore, supra note 47 (arguing that
determining what constitutes credible science is the province of the scientific community,
not patent law); Seymore, supra note 24 (arguing that current novelty doctrine can pro-
duce paradoxical outcomes for complex inventions and is seemingly incongruous with
basic principles of patent law); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009)
(arguing that although accidental discoveries pervade science, inventors who invent by
accident can be unjustly deprived of patents because such discoveries do not mesh with the
substantive law of invention).
69 Cf. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 162 (11th ed. 2004) (defining
building block as “a unit of construction or composition; esp[ecially]: something essential
on which a larger entity is based”).
70 The “something else” can either be an invention or something that is previously
known.
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ity.71  A “well-established” utility is one “which is well known, immediately
apparent, or implied by the [applicant’s] disclosure of the properties of a
material.”72  For example, bricks build walls, steel beams carry loads, and
software modules are put together to build software programs.  These build-
ing blocks all come from the “predictable” arts—named as such because they
are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors.73  In the predictable arts, util-
ity is often considered to be “so apparent as to virtually jump off the page and
slap a PHOSITA in the face.”74
In contrast, microscale building blocks—things like chemical compounds
and gene fragments—are subjected to more rigorous § 101 scrutiny.  These
building blocks all emerge from fields like chemistry, pharmacology, and bio-
technology—referred to as the “unpredictable” arts because a PHOSITA
often cannot easily predict reactivity or outcomes.75  Experimentation is
often required to achieve success in creating the bigger substance.  This para-
digm has proven to be very unsettling for patent law and opens the door for
foresight bias.  As the law currently stands, microscale building blocks with
no specific and substantial utility at the time of filing the patent application
are unpatentable.76  The fear is that granting patents on these “upstream”
building blocks will create problems for future research and hinder down-
stream innovation.77  Gatekeeping is so important that the utility section of
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure78 lists building block inventions that
patent examiners should immediately reject.79
71 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
§ 2107.02(II) (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter MPEP].  The MPEP provides guidance to patent
examiners and is regarded as the Patent Office’s official interpretation of statutes and reg-
ulations.  Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
72 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAINING
MATERIALS 7 (1999) [hereinafter INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES].
73 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
74 Seymore, supra note 47, at 1531 (quoting Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra
note 68, at 156 n.151); cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 546 U.S. 454, 456–57 (2006) (per
curiam) (evaluating the “jump off the page” standard in the context of an employment
discrimination suit (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004))).
75 Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 68, at 136–54.  For example, in the
chemical arts, “a slight variation in a [structure or] method can yield an unpredictable
result or may not work at all.”  Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL
452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
76 See infra Section I.C.
77 See infra Section II.B.
78 See MPEP, supra note 71.
79 See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 71, § 2107.01(I)(B) (identifying as unpatentable basic
research, chemical intermediates, and methods of making chemical intermediates where
the end product does not have an identifiable utility).
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B. Why Did Foresight Bias Develop?
1. A New Invention Landscape
Throughout most of the history of U.S. patent law, the threshold for
utility was low.  By the late nineteenth century, some beneficial use was suffi-
cient to establish utility80 unless the invention was inoperable (totally incapa-
ble of achieving its intended result)81 or detrimental to the public interest.82
The standard was truly de minimis, as noted in an 1883 treatise, The Patenta-
bility of Inventions,83 which stated that “[a]s to the term ‘useful,’ the courts
have construed the condition expressed by it so liberally that it almost never
serves to defeat a patent.”84  Importantly, the de minimis standard applied
across the board to all inventions.85
This, however, did not last.  It is important to note that patentability doc-
trines like utility emerged during the first century of the U.S. patent system
when inventions were still primarily mechanical devices.86  The invention
landscape changed around the time of World War II when key break-
throughs in antibiotic, vitamin, and hormone research spawned the “thera-
peutic revolution”87 and the advent of many first-generation wonder drugs.88
80 Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217) (articulating the
“some beneficial use” threshold).
81 Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1873) (explaining that utility is
lacking “where it appears that [the invention] is not capable of being used to effect the
object proposed”).
82 This negative requirement is attributed to Justice Story, who wrote that an inven-
tion’s asserted utility could not be “injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order
of society.” Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
83 HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1883).
84 Id. at 75, quoted in In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 179 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
85 See, e.g., Potter v. Tone, 36 App. D.C. 181, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (rejecting the
contention that the claimed compound must have a commercial use and holding that the
description of its characteristics and properties had value for educational and research
purposes and were sufficient to establish utility), discussed in David A. Anderson & Edward
E. Dyson, Note, Some Special Problems with the Utility Requirement in Chemical Patents, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 809, 810 (1967) (“The court felt that to require a showing of use in some
commercial process . . . would amount to a holding that the inventor must make another
invention which could be the subject of another patent.”); Ex parte Watt, 63 U.S.P.Q. 163,
165 (B.P.A.I. 1942) (determining that a chemical compound whose sole use was that of a
chemical intermediate met the utility requirement).
86 See John Hoxie, A Patent Attorney’s View, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 630, 636 (1965)
(exploring the evolution of inventions from being mostly electrical-mechanical to chemical
in nature); Noonan, supra note 38, at 263–64 (same).
87 PHARM. PANEL COMM. ON TECH. AND INT’L ECON. AND TRADE ISSUES ET AL., THE COM-
PETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7–11 (1983) [hereinafter THE COM-
PETITIVE STATUS].
88 See, e.g., Process for Obtaining Vitamins, U.S. Patent No. 2,049,988 (filed Sep. 27,
1932) (issued Aug. 4, 1936) (Vitamin B1; assigned to Research Corporation); Alloxazines
and Isoalloxazines and Processes for Their Production, U.S. Patent No. 2,261,608 (filed
Mar. 21, 1940) (issued Nov. 4, 1941) (Vitamin B2; assigned to Merck); Process of Treating
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During this period, pharmaceutical companies quickly switched from a man-
ufacturing to a research-based model and secured patents that allowed them
to dominate sectors of specific therapeutic markets.89  This, in turn, quickly
forced the Patent Office and the courts to wrestle with fields key to drug
research—like organic chemistry.90  But the courts did so, at least initially, by
viewing therapeutic claims with skepticism and rigidly applying mechanical-
electrical patent doctrine to these unpredictable fields.91  This led to nonsen-
sical outcomes and forged a disconnect between patent law and the scientific
community.
Until this point, the courts and the Patent Office agreed that chemical
compounds had patentable utility despite the lack of a disclosed specific end
use.92  Thus, building blocks were treated no differently than other chemical
compounds.93  As Justice Harlan explained in Brenner v. Manson, “usefulness
was typically regarded as inherent during a long and prolific period of chemi-
cal research and development in this country.”94  But this liberal view began
to deteriorate in 1950 when the C.C.P.A. issued its opinion in In re Bremner.95
The applicant attempted to claim eight hard plastics and methods of making
them,96 but “said nothing whatever about use, [and] left it to the art to guess
what to do with them on the basis of what he told about their properties.”97
The court upheld the Patent Office’s rejection, stating that “the law requires
that there be in the application an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or
uses intended.  It was never intended that a patent be granted upon a product,
or a process producing a product, unless such product be useful.”98  As far as
utility is concerned, two commentators aptly observe that “there can be little
doubt that the hard resins disclosed had some utility that was clear from their
physical properties.”99  Bremner’s problem was not so much a utility prob-
lem, but rather one of inadequate disclosure—a failure to comply with the
enablement requirement of § 112.100  As Judge Rich later explained, Brem-
Pregnene Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 2,462,133 (filed Feb. 23, 1946) (issued Feb. 22,
1949) (synthesis of cortisone; assigned to Merck).
89 See THE COMPETITIVE STATUS, supra note 87, at 7–11.
90 Noonan, supra note 38, at 263–69.
91 See id.; see also Hoxie, supra note 86, at 636 (explaining how the judiciary tried to fit
chemical inventions into the mold of mechanical-electrical inventions and contending that
the judiciary’s interpretation of the patent statute did not change even as chemical inven-
tions became more frequent).
92 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
94 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 540 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
95 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
96 Id. at 216.
97 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 185 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (distinguishing Bremner).
98 In re Bremner, 182 F.2d at 217.
99 Anderson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 811.
100 Enablement requires that the applicant provide a disclosure that teaches a
PHOSITA both how to make and how to use the invention. See infra subsection II.B.1.
Importantly, I argue that an applicant can satisfy the “how to use” prong of the enablement
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ner “did not disclose enough as to their properties to enable one even to
make an intelligent guess as to a use.”101  But even if Bremner can properly be
viewed as a disclosure problem, the Patent Office adopted a rigid and expan-
sive interpretation of the above-quoted passage and relentlessly sought a
higher utility standard for chemical compounds.102
2. The Battle over Building Blocks
A pivotal opinion addressing the patentability of building blocks is In re
Nelson,103 a 1960 case that called into question the intrinsic value of chemical
compounds.  The applicant sought to patent a host of microscale building
blocks referred to as chemical intermediates.104  The issue for the court was
whether a chemical intermediate has its own utility or whether the applicant
had to disclose a use for the end product in order to obtain a patent on the
intermediate.  Writing for the court’s majority105 in an opinion that has been
described as a “judicial bombshell”106 and the “single most important patent
‘utility’ decision of the CCPA,”107 Judge Giles Rich (the co-drafter of the
1952 Patent Act and regarded by many as “the founding father of modern
requirement of § 112 yet still fail to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101. See discussion
infra subsection II.B.1.c.
101 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 185 (emphasis added).
102 In 1956, a few years after Bremner, the Commissioner of Patents squarely rejected the
Patent Office’s pre-war, liberal view of utility in chemical cases:
[I]n the past very little attention was paid to the requirement for a disclosure of
utility in chemical cases.  Some chemical patents were issued with specifications
reciting the barest suggestions of uses for the new compounds claimed, or even
without uses being stated at all.  It was generally the position of the Patent Office
that a chemical compound could be regarded as an intermediate substance useful
in the preparation of other compounds, since it was regarded as obvious that any
organic compound could be so used.
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952–53 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (quoting a speech
made by Robert C. Watson to an American Chemical Society meeting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  By steadily ratcheting up the utility requirement since the early 1950s,
Judge Giles Rich contended that the Patent Office had raised it “above anything required
by the statute or by [C.C.P.A. caselaw] and develop[ed] its own brand new theories and
philosophy about what the statute means by ‘useful.’” Id. at 952.  With that said, there
were C.C.P.A. judges who were sympathetic to the Patent Office’s view. See infra notes 105
& 142 and accompanying text.
103 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180.
104 Id. at 180.  For example, A + B react to make I (the intermediate).  Then, a chemist
can react I with C or D (or something else) to make other compounds.
105 There were dissenting views on the court. See id. at 190 (Worley, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he net effect of granting a patent here will be to give appellants an unearned monop-
oly on a substantial area in the field of chemistry . . . .”); id. at 190–92 (Kirkpatrick, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of reading “useful” out of the patent statute).
106 James F. Davis, Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct.
2009, at 8, 11.
107 Lynn E. Eccleston & Harold C. Wegner, The Rich-Smith Years of the U.S. Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 49, 51 (2009).
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patent law”)108 explained that to require the latter would frustrate funda-
mental goals of the patent system:
We have never received a clear answer to the question “Useful to whom and
for what?”  Surely a new group of steroid intermediates is useful to chemists
doing research on steroids, and in a “practical” sense too.  Such intermediates
are “useful” under section 101.  They are often actually placed on the market
before much, if anything, is known as to what they are “good” for, other than
experimentation and the making of other compounds in the important field
of research.  Refusal to protect them at this stage would inhibit their wide
dissemination, together with the knowledge of them which a patent disclo-
sure conveys, which disclosure the potential protection encourages.  This
would tend to retard rather than promote progress.109
In addition to making it clear that the degree of utility is irrelevant,110
Nelson revealed that an invention’s benefit to the public could be indirect.111
Nelson was a triumph for the research community and very important for
the growth of the chemical, pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and pharma-
ceutical industries.112  Aside from reaffirming that the standard for utility is
de minimis,113 the opinion recognized that “in the chemical industry, pure
research often has an intrinsic utility despite no immediate use for the fruits
of the research.”114  Had Nelson remained good law, it would have settled the
building block problem and done much to bridge the gap between patent
law and scientific research.
108 F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 24 (5th ed. 2011).  Judge Rich
joined the C.C.P.A. in 1956 and later served on the Federal Circuit until his death in 1999
at age 95. Id.
109 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180–81.
110 See id. at 178 (“[I]t has never been a requirement for patentability that there must
be any particular degree of utility.”).  As stated in the Curtis treatise:
[I]t follows, that every invention for which a patent is claimed must be, to a cer-
tain extent, beneficial to the community; it must be capable of use for some bene-
ficial purpose; but, when this is the case, the degree of utility, whether larger or
smaller, is not a subject for consideration in determining whether the invention
will support a patent.
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 28 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1854); cf. 1 WIL-
LIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 341 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1890) (“When actual utility exists, its degree is unimportant.”).
111 Cf. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 110, § 341 (“Nor is it necessary that this advantage,
whether great or small, should flow directly from his art or instrument, considered by
itself.”).
112 Davis, supra note 106, at 11–12.
113 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180 (“To possess utility, a thing or a process must be capable
of producing a result, and that result must be a good result.” (quoting ALBERT H. WALKER,
TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 77 (New York, L.K.
Strouse & Co., 2d ed. 1889))).  Thus, according to the court, “the concept[ ] [of utility is]
simple.” Id.
114 Salim A. Hasan, A Call for Reconsideration of the Strict Utility Standard in Chemical Patent
Practice, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 245, 253–54 (1994).
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The conflict between the C.C.P.A. and the Patent Office led the
Supreme Court to enter the controversy in the 1966 case Brenner v. Man-
son.115  The case was about Manson’s attempt to provoke an interference—a
fight between two inventors over who is entitled to a patent.116  The inven-
tion at issue was a new process for making a steroid (X).  By the time Manson
filed his patent application, the Patent Office had already issued a patent on
the process to a competitor.117  Although Manson could prove that he was
the first to invent the process, the examiner would not declare an interfer-
ence (to sort out who did) and rejected Manson’s application because it
failed to disclose a utility for X.118
Manson argued that X’s utility could be presumed because other steroids
of similar chemical structure were known to inhibit tumors in mice.119  On
appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the exam-
iner’s rejection because the unpredictable nature of steroid chemistry made
it impossible to presume that X would have the same tumor-inhibiting
properties as the other compounds.120  A divided C.C.P.A. reversed, holding
that “a process which operates as disclosed to produce a known product is
[itself] ‘useful’ within the meaning of section 101” so long as “it is not, in
operation or result, detrimental to the public interest.”121
115 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
116 Under the first-to-invent system, patent rights are only awarded to the first inventor.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2012).  When two parties claim the same invention, the Patent Office
institutes an “interference” proceeding to determine priority (i.e., which party is entitled to
a patent). Id.  The first party to reduce the invention to practice usually wins; however, a
party that was “first to conceive the invention but last to reduce it to practice” (either
actively or constructively) will win if that party “demonstrates reasonable diligence
[toward] reduction to practice.”  Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
117 See Process for the Production of 2-Methyl-Dihydrotestosterones, U.S. Patent No.
2,908,693 (filed Dec. 17, 1956) (issued Oct. 13, 1959).
118 When a person believes that he or she is the inventor of the subject matter claimed
by another in a patent application or issued patent, the remedy is to file a patent applica-
tion claiming that subject matter to “provoke” an interference with the other application
or issued patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 135.
119 Manson, 383 U.S. at 521–22.
120 As stated by the Board, “‘It is our view that the statutory requirement of usefulness
of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be closely related to
another compound which is known to be useful.’” Id. at 522.  This is true because “‘minor
changes in the structure of a steroid may produce profound changes in its biological activ-
ity.’” Id. at 532 n.19 (quoting Transcript of Record at 52, Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (No. 58));
cf. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he properties of these structurally similar compounds [can] vary significantly with
minor structural changes.”).
121 In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  The court’s rationale was that
a process (such as a method of making something) is a separate category of invention
specifically recognized in the statute. Id. at 236; see also 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (“The term
‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process . . . .”).
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The Supreme Court reversed.  Agreeing with the Patent Office, the
Court held that an inventor seeking to patent a new process for making a
compound could only do so if the inventor could establish utility for the
compound.122  Put differently, a process for making a compound like X,
which is useful only as—in the words of the majority—an “object of scientific
research” lacks utility and is therefore unpatentable.123  In dicta,124 but very
importantly for present purposes, the majority stated that the compound itself
also lacks utility if it is to serve merely as an “object” for further scientific
research.125
Interestingly, the majority conceded that in contemporary chemistry,
“little or nothing is wholly beyond the pale of ‘utility.’”126  To be sure, even
chemicals and chemical processes that are only used for research purposes
would pass the three-pronged de minimis test.127  Recall that under that test,
some beneficial use is sufficient to establish utility unless the invention is
inoperable or detrimental to the public interest.128  But as applied to chemi-
cal inventions, the majority believed that the “beneficial use” and “public
interest” prongs “shed[ ] little light on [the] subject” because they are overin-
clusive.129  That the chemical or chemical process can operate to produce
the intended result remains a necessary condition for utility but is insuffi-
cient on its own to warrant a patent.130
The Court then announced the heightened utility standard: “Unless and
until a process is refined and developed to this point—where specific benefit
exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification for per-
mitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”131
Requiring less, according to the majority, could allow the patentee to create a
“monopoly of knowledge”132 which could “engross a vast, unknown, and per-
haps unknowable area.”133  The patent could become a “hunting license,”134
122 Manson, 383 U.S. at 531, 534–35.
123 Id. at 535.
124 “The term dicta typically refers to statements in a judicial opinion that are not neces-
sary to support the decision reached by the court.”  Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994).  Dicta “is usually contrasted with a holding, a term
used to refer to a rule or principle that decides the case.” Id. (footnote omitted).
125 The Court explained that the argument(s) against patenting the process “would
apply equally to the patenting of the product produced by the process.” Manson, 383 U.S.
at 535.  Even if this statement could be viewed as dicta, the C.C.P.A. so held in subsequent
cases. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 139–54.
126 Manson, 383 U.S. at 530.
127 See supra subsection I.B.1.
128 See supra subsection I.B.1.
129 Manson, 383 U.S. at 533.
130 See id. at 532.
131 Id. at 534–35 (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 534.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 536.
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conferring the power to “block off whole areas of scientific development,
without compensating benefit to the public.”135
And so the Manson majority fell victim to foresight bias.  Again, the fear
is that granting patents on certain inventions early on will create problems
for future research and hinder downstream innovation.136  In doing so, the
majority failed to appreciate that upstream patents promote efficiency by
allowing the upstream patentee to coordinate downstream innovation, pre-
vent duplicative research, and encourage sharing of useful information.137
The majority minimized Justice Harlan’s concern that a more rigorous utility
standard could actually inhibit scientific progress by encouraging the inventor
to maintain secrecy until an acceptable “use” is discovered.138
The C.C.P.A. quickly extended Manson to apply directly to microscale
building blocks.  In the companion cases In re Kirk139 and In re Joly,140 the
court reversed Nelson and held that chemical intermediates are unpatentable
if the end product has no known use.141  Writing for the Kirk majority, Chief
Judge Worley (Judge Rich’s “nemesis”)142 explained:
It is not enough that the specification disclose that the intermediate exists
and that it “works,” reacts, or can be used to produce some intended prod-
uct of no known use.  Nor is it enough that the product disclosed to be
obtained from the intermediate belongs to some class of compounds which
now is, or in the future might be, the subject of research to determine some
specific use.143
Thus, the majority adopted the Patent Office’s view that a heightened
utility standard should apply to chemical building block inventions.
To say that this issue fractured the court would be an understatement.
Kirk and Joly each included lengthy and sharply worded dissenting opin-
ions144 from the two patent lawyers on the court: Judges Arthur Smith145 and
135 Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
136 See infra Section III.B.
137 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
276–77 (1977).
138 Manson, 383 U.S. at 538–39 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  For additional discussion related to Justice Harlan’s concerns about secrecy, see
infra note 323.
139 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
140 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
141 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945; In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 908–09.
142 Eccleston & Wegner, supra note 107, at 50 (“In 1959, President Eisenhower
bestowed upon Judge Rich both a blessing and a curse; he simultaneously nominated one
of the nation’s best patent attorneys to the bench, Arthur M. Smith of Michigan, while
elevating his nemesis Eugene Worley to the position of Chief Judge.”).
143 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945, quoted in In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 908.
144 See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 947–68 (Rich, J., dissenting); In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 910–36
(Smith, J., dissenting).
145 Judge Smith practiced patent law in Chicago and Detroit and taught patent law at
the University of Michigan Law School before joining the C.C.P.A. in 1959. GILES S. RICH,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 142–46
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Giles Rich.146  They argued that the higher burden placed on those seeking
chemical building block patents is irrational,147 discriminatory,148
improper,149 overreaching,150 and “changes the intent and meaning of the
Patent Act.”151
An important question is whether the Kirk and Joly holdings were
required by Manson.  The dissenters in those cases and several commentators
answer in the negative, suggesting that the majority relied on dicta.152  Judge
Rich believed that the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule Nelson.153
As he saw it, ratcheting up the utility standard for chemical building blocks
was an unwarranted extension of Manson.154
(1980).  He was “one of the most analytically astute patent-experienced members of the
judiciary.”  Eccleston & Wegner, supra note 107, at 50.
146 For a discussion of Judge Rich and his legacy, see sources cited supra notes 106–07.
147 See In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 928 (Smith, J., dissenting) (discussing the “[i]nsupportable
[r]ationale of the [m]ajority [o]pinion”).
148 See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 962 (Rich, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Patent Office’s
policy applied through the chemical examining group “is something of a discrimination in
legal administration”); id. at 967 (Smith, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s
position is supporting evidence that “chemical inventors are being wrongfully discrimi-
nated against”); In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 931 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The inventors of chemi-
cal tools should neither be discriminated against nor confused with those who devise ways
and purposes to apply those tools.”).
149 See In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 929 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither the Intel-
lectual Property Clause nor the patent statute distinguishes between classes of inventors or
subject matter).
150 Id. at 910 (“The drastic and far reaching amendment of the statute which results
from the majority decision here and in Kirk should be the sole responsibility of Congress
after due investigation and proper weighing of its effect . . . .”); cf. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at
950–51 (Rich, J., dissenting) (“If usefulness was typically regarded as inherent during a long and
prolific period of chemical research and development in this country, surely this is added reason
why the Court’s result should not be adopted until Congress expressly mandates it, pre-
sumably on the basis of empirical data which this Court does not possess.” (quoting Bren-
ner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 540 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
151 In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 910 (Smith, J., dissenting); cf. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 954 (Rich,
J., dissenting) (“Considering, finally, that the present statute, the Patent Act of 1952, § 101,
was enacted without the slightest indication of any intent to change the law, as expressed in
the cases, texts, and administrative practice, it is clear that the majority here is indulging in
judicial law-making . . . .”).
152 See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 948–49 (Rich, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Man-
son majority “expressly reserved judgment with the phrase ‘we express no view’ on a group
of our cases in which we held new chemical compounds to be ‘useful,’ though having utility
only in scientific investigation”); Anderson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 815 (“In the first cases
dealing with the area of ‘utility’ since Manson, the Nelson dissenters carried the day, giving
great scope to the Manson dicta that was unfavorable to the Nelson decision.” (footnote
omitted)).
153 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 949–50.
154 Id. at 948–49.  Judge Rich noted that unlike the product at issue in Kirk, the issue
before the Manson Court “was, primarily, the right of Manson to an interference with an
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C. The Current Paradigm
So what actually happens when someone applies for a chemical building
block invention?  In a general sense, as described by Judge Smith in his
twenty-six page dissent in Joly,155 these inventors “are improperly set apart
from all inventors as a class”156 and are burdened with special requirements,
including the need for “more of a disclosure of utility for a chemical ‘tool,’
than what they require from inventors in the other technical areas.”157
(Judge Smith’s term “tool” is, of course, synonymous with “building block.”)
The ultimate question for him was: “[H]ow far can the inventor of a chemical
‘tool’ be legally required to go . . . in disclosing utility of his invention?”158
The short answer is very far indeed.
To understand why, it is important to briefly describe the contours of
the modern utility requirement.  The current test applied in the Patent
Office and sanctioned by the Federal Circuit has three prongs.  The first
prong, operability or credible utility, is the only one retained from the nine-
teenth-century test.  It requires that the invention be capable of achieving its
intended result.159  Operability is gauged by asking if a PHOSITA would con-
sider the inventor’s assertions believable.160
The two other prongs, “specific” and “substantial” utility, were identified
but not fully defined in Manson.161  The Federal Circuit did so nearly thirty
years later in In re Fisher162 when it essentially adopted the Patent Office’s
guidelines for assessing utility.163  For substantial utility, a PHOSITA must be
issued patent on a process claim, a subsidiary issue being the sufficiency of the affidavits.”
Id. at 948–49 (footnote omitted).
155 In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 910–36 (Smith, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 929.
157 Id.; cf. Anderson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 817 (“The broad reach of Kirk and Joly
will work a hardship on chemical researchers, who have now been excluded from the class
of people for whom compounds are ‘useful.’”).
158 In re Joly, 376 F.2d at 929.
159 Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that a “device lacks
utility” when “it does not operate to produce what [the inventor] claims it does” (quoting
Newman v. Quigg, 681 F. Supp. 16, 23 (D.D.C. 1988))); cf. In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966
(C.C.P.A. 1931) (“It is fundamental in patent law that an alleged invention . . . must appear
capable of doing the things claimed . . . .”).
160 The Patent Office can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant’s disclosure “sug-
gest[s] an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve[s] implausible scientific princi-
ples.” In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).  A finding of inoperability means that the claimed invention
lacks a credible utility. Id. at 1356; INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 72, at 11 (“[A]
utility that is inoperative is not credible.”).
161 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966).
162 421 F.3d 1365, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
163 Id. at 1372 (“The [Patent Office’s] standards for assessing whether a claimed inven-
tion has a specific and substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation . . . .”)
(citing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.
1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Utility Examination Guidelines]); see id. at 1374 (“We
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able to use the invention to provide a “significant” and “immediate” benefit
to the public.164  In other words, the patent application “must show that an
invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it
may prove useful at some future date after further research.”165
Finally, specific utility requires that an invention “provide a well-defined
and particular benefit to the public.”166  The purpose of this requirement is
to deny patents for inventions where the asserted use is “so vague as to be
meaningless.”167  For example, asserted uses like “biological activity” or “use-
ful for technical and pharmaceutical purposes” fail the requirement.168
A lack-of-utility rejection triggers an evidentiary burden-shifting pro-
cess.169  Once the examiner has established a prima facie case of
unpatentability, the burden shifts to the applicant to either attack or rebut
it.170  An applicant can successfully attack the prima facie case if the exam-
iner produces no (or insufficient) evidence to support a finding of nonutil-
ity.171  Alternatively, an applicant can concede the prima facie case and rebut
it.  So, for example, if specific utility is at issue, the burden shifts to the appli-
cant to come forward with persuasive arguments or evidence sufficient to
show that the invention provides an immediate benefit to the public.172
When the applicant submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must “start
over” and “consider all of the evidence anew.”173  The examiner must deter-
mine patentability based on the entire record, with a preponderance of the
agree with the Board [of Patent Appeals and Interferences] that the facts here are similar
to those in Brenner.”).  The guidelines have been incorporated into the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure. See MPEP, supra note 71, § 2107.  The MPEP and Utility Examina-
tion Guidelines “‘are not binding on [the Federal Circuit], but may be given judicial
notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute.’” In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372
(quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
164 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371 (citing Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A.
1980)).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Ex parte Aggarwal, No. 90-3041, 1992 WL 176683, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 14,
1992) (“There is no question that appellants have made an important discovery with
regard to chemical compounds (proteins) which are the subject of serious scientific investi-
gation [but it is nevertheless unpatentable because of its] unverified and speculative
utility.”).
169 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (describing the framework).
170 See id.
171 MPEP, supra note 71, § 2107(II)(C); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (explaining that the examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima
facie case of unpatentability); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(applying the prima facie case to § 101).
172 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
173 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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evidence as the standard of proof.174  Whether an invention complies with
the utility requirement of § 101 is a question of fact.175
II. ELIMINATING FORESIGHT BIAS IN THE UNPREDICTABLE ARTS
Allowing foresight bias to drive patentability determinations has come at
a cost.  It disconnects patent law from many of the technological communi-
ties that it serves and ultimately frustrates fundamental goals of the patent
system.  It is now time for microscale building blocks to become patentable—
even if no use is disclosed.  This essentially removes utility from the patenta-
bility calculus.  Here I describe how concerns about patent breadth and tech-
nical merit can be addressed through compliance with (or more rigorous
enforcement of) enablement and nonobviousness—patentability require-
ments that (unlike utility) are rooted in objective, fact-based inquiries.  This
approach will essentially eliminate foresight bias in the unpredictable arts.
A. Normative Perspectives
Patent law functions as a unitary system in that all inventions—irrespec-
tive of technological field—must satisfy the same statutory patentability crite-
ria.176  In theory, the patent system is technology-neutral, meaning that it
does not differentiate across technologies or industries.177  In practice, how-
ever, the courts apply the facially neutral patent statutes differently to differ-
ent technologies.178  Sometimes this must be done to adjust patent doctrines
to accommodate new types of inventions as technology evolves.179  However,
courts should not craft technology-specific rules based on speculation about
the potential negative consequences of granting a patent.180  But this is pre-
cisely what happens when the courts fall victim to foresight bias.
Judicial partiality is no stranger to patent law, particularly when it is
done for the sake of innovation.  For example, in earlier times, the courts
favored extraordinary technological advances by rewarding the owners of
174 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
175 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
176 See supra note 5.
177 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1576–77 (2003).  As a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights of the World Trade Organization (TRIPS Agreement), the United States
agrees that patent rights shall be “enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of
technology” subject only to a few enumerated exceptions.  Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, arts. 70.6, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
178 Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1156.
179 In theory, this allows the patent system “to adapt flexibly to both old and new tech-
nologies, encompassing ‘anything under the sun that is made by man.’”  Burk & Lemley,
supra note 177, at 1576 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
180 Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Con-
troversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1988).
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such inventions “with exceptionally broad claim scope in exchange for their
outsized technological contribution to society.”181  As Professor Brian Love
has described, this special treatment, “which helped inventors like Edison,
Bell, and Marconi turn their inventions into the technological giants we
know today as General Electric, AT&T, and RCA, has over time influenced
many aspects of patent law, not to mention the very history of innovation.”182
Back then, their inventions were the ones that society cared the most about
because they brought radical benefits to everyday life.183
This partiality continues to the present day.  It is hard to argue that more
judicial and scholarly attention focuses on biotechnology rather than
masonry—genes rather than bricks.  This is understandable because the field
of biotechnology promises potentially limitless new possibilities and benefits
for humankind.184  So it is not at all surprising that much attention has been
paid to microscale building blocks.  An ever-present concern is if granting
patents on them tends to promote innovation more than impede it.185  But
using a subjective patentability standard like utility is too blunt an instrument
to achieve this goal.  What emerges is a dubious body of judge-made law,
which ultimately does more harm than good.186
One might ask why microscale building blocks raise utility concerns at
the Patent Office and in the courts, but macroscale building blocks do not.
There are at least two possible explanations for the disparate treatment.  One
possibility is that upstream patents on microscale building blocks are more
likely to impede follow-on research and innovation than patents on macros-
cale building blocks.  But Scott Kieff argues that they are not:
181 Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382 (2012).
182 Id. (footnote omitted).
183 Id. at 382 n.3; cf. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer
Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) (“[L]aypersons and technologists share the
view that pioneer inventions are crucial to the sort of technological advance that the patent
system is designed to encourage.  They are the inventions with which we are most familiar,
and those we care most about.” (footnotes omitted)).
184 See generally, e.g., JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY 224 (1998) (describing how
biotechnology provides “near limitless possibilities to reconstruct and reinvent the body,
move DNA across species boundaries, erase the genetic past, and pre-program the genetic
future”); GEORGE WOLFF, THE BIOTECH INVESTOR’S BIBLE 326 (2001) (“With the long-term
potential to cure most major diseases and to revolutionize industries as diverse as
pharmaceuticals and forestry, petrochemicals and agriculture, the possibilities for
biotech—and its investors—are limitless.”); Linda A. Fothergill-Gilmore & Lindsay Sawyer,
Protein Engineering, in BIOTECHNOLOGY 155, 162 (Vivian Moses & Ronald E. Cape eds., 2d
ed. 1999) (noting that creating new proteins with new activities gives rise to “possibilities
[that] seem almost limitless, especially when one considers that a medium sized protein
with 300 amino acids has 20300 possible sequences”).
185 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(“And monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”).
186 Scott Baker, Can the Courts Rescue Us from the Patent Crisis?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 593, 595
(2010) (reviewing BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1).
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It cannot be, however, that patents on inputs generally prevent the produc-
tion of outputs.  Entire industries have come and gone using scores of pat-
ented inputs.  Every car is made using countless patented parts, fasteners,
processes, and subsystems.  Even the biological scientist manages to use a
variety of patented machines, reagents, and equipment in the ordinary
course of research.  It does not appear that [critics] would argue that pro-
ducers of biological innovations should not have to pay the licensing fee for
ordinary inputs, including, for example, the intermittent windshield wiper
subsystems on the car they drive to the laboratory in the morning.187
The other possibility, related but distinct, is that microscale building
blocks deserve more scrutiny because they are qualitatively different than
macroscale building blocks.  This reasoning—which relates directly to the
problem of scale discussed above188—is in accord with the tendency of peo-
ple to fear things that they cannot see, let alone understand.189  But micros-
cale and macroscale building blocks are not qualitatively different.  As one
commentator wisely observes, “ ‘[chemical] intermediates or building blocks
are very little different from bricks which as individual pieces of cermic [sic]
material have no utility but which do have utility because they can be
fabricated into a wall or other structure.’”190  Indeed, chemical building
blocks “‘are no less useful to a skilled chemist than bricks to an architect or
mason.’”191
B. Allowing Patents on Building Blocks
This Section describes how to render microscale building blocks patent-
able with minimal costs to society.  This is achieved through enablement and
nonobviousness—two patentability requirements rooted in objective, fact-
intensive inquiries.  Enablement constrains the scope of the patent, whereas
nonobviousness excludes the patenting of inventions that lack technical
merit because the claimed subject matter is too close to what is already
known.
1. Constraining Claim Scope Through Enablement
The basic way to limit the exclusionary right conferred by the patent
grant is to constrain claim scope—the “technological territory” that the
187 F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 697, 720 (2001).
188 See supra Section I.A.
189 This can be traced to the Latin proverb “Damnant quod non intellegunt,” which
literally means “[t]hey condemn what they do not understand.” WALDO E. SWEET, LATIN
PROVERBS 87 (Georgia Irby-Massie & Scott Van Horn eds., 2002).
190 Edward H. Valance, Patentability of Chemical Intermediates: The “Nelson” Case in Perspec-
tive, 3 J. CHEM. DOCUMENTATION 33, 34 (1963) (quoting Brief for Connecticut Patent Law
Association as Amicus Curiae at 10, In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (No.
6338)).
191 Id.
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inventor claims is his or hers to control.192  Claim scope plays a central role
in patent law.193  It can be defined as the “metes and bounds” of the territory
conferred by the patent grant.194  Specifically, a patent gives the patentee the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the claimed invention for any use of that invention, regardless of
whether the patentee envisioned such use.195  For a microscale building
block like a chemical compound, this means that “[a] claim to the com-
pound, per se, dominates every method of making that compound and every
single use of that compound, every single mixture of different components
that includes that compound, and every end use composition inclusive of the
compound.”196
Yet this broad scope is not all bad.  The ability of patentees to control
future uses and downstream research that flows from the invention is a key
tenet of the prospect theory of patents.197  In addition, as illustrated by the
AcmePharma hypothetical presented in the Introduction, generating
research tools like microscale building blocks is a capital-intensive endeavor,
192 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990).
193 See id. at 839 (“The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope: the
broader the scope, the larger the number of competing products and processes that will
infringe the patent.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms,
104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2005) (explaining that claims “are central to virtually every
aspect of patent law”); Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (stating that in
patent law, “the name of the game is the claim”).
194 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent
confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected
invention.”).
195 Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)); cf. Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“The
inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no
matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”).
196 HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTI-
CALS § 260, at 301 (2d ed. 1994).
197 See Kitch, supra note 137, at 266 (articulating the prospect theory of patents).  As
explained by one commentator:
One of the main concerns motivating the prospect theory in the patent con-
text is the idea that if an inventor is not allowed to control future uses and devel-
opment of the invention early on, this is likely to result in wasteful duplicative
efforts among inventors.  An improver might decide to take the inventor’s nas-
cent idea and develop and commercialize it, regardless of the fact that the inven-
tor is doing the exact same thing (perhaps in the belief that he is likely to be the
first to do so).  This, the prospect theory argues, results in a redundancy, or dead-
weight loss, that has no social benefit.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1623
(2009).
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which would provide private firms with little incentive to invent without some
degree of exclusivity.198
One fear of granting patents on microscale building blocks is that they
can be so expansive that they hinder follow-on inventive activity without a
compensating benefit to the public.199  This need not be the case because a
mechanism exists in patent law that prevents this from happening.  The prin-
cipal tool for constraining claim scope is enablement—one of the three statu-
tory disclosure requirements appearing in the first paragraph of § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying
out the invention.200
It obliges an applicant to disclose the claimed invention in sufficient detail to
“enable” a PHOSITA to practice (make and use) its full scope at the time of
filing201 without undue experimentation.202  The purpose of the require-
ment is to ensure that the property right granted to the inventor “is of an
appropriate scope, in light of the contribution her research makes to the
relevant field.”203  Thus, enablement “seeks to determine whether the inven-
tor’s claims adequately reflect her research—whether, in effect, she is claim-
ing more than she taught [the PHOSITA].”204  The scope of enablement205
198 Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent
Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 906 (2009); cf. Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A
Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 451 (2004) (“So if there are, for example, very
expensive development costs and high innovation costs, we would want to make it easier to
get a patent and easier to get a big patent, as to offer a big reward and big incentive to
invest in innovation.”).
199 Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for
Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 271–72 (2008).
200 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (emphasis added).
201 In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[The] enablement determination is made
retrospectively, i.e., by looking back to the filing date of the patent application and determin-
ing whether undue experimentation would have been required to make and use the claimed
invention at that time.”).
202 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  While “‘undue experimenta-
tion’ does not appear in the statute, . . . it is well established that enablement requires that
the specification teach [PHOSITAs] to make and use the invention without undue experi-
mentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
203 Merges, supra note 63, at 18.
204 Id.
205 The scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written description of
the invention plus what is known by a PHOSITA without undue experimentation.  Nat’l
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
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sets the outer boundaries of the claim, meaning that narrow enablement will
result in narrowed claim scope.206
Enablement is a standard.207  Determining whether a disclosure is ena-
bling is a legal conclusion that rests on underlying factual inquiries.208  The
Federal Circuit set forth several factors relevant to the enablement analysis in
In re Wands.209  They are: (1) the “amount of direction or guidance
presented” in the disclosure, (2) the existence of “working examples,” (3)
“the nature of the invention,” (4) “the predictability or unpredictability of
the art,” (5) the PHOSITA’s level of skill, (6) “the state of the prior art,” (7)
“the breadth of the claims,” and (8) “the quantity of experimentation neces-
sary” to practice the claimed invention.210  While not mandatory,211 the
Wands factors are ubiquitous in evaluating enablement212 because they touch
on issues that are important in virtually all enablement determinations.213
These include issues related to the technical scope and substance of the dis-
closure (factors one and two),214 the nature of the technology (factors three
and four),215 the PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill (factor five),216 and the
scope of the claim sought (factor seven).217  Importantly for present pur-
poses, the Wands factors provide the decision-maker with a list of objective
206 See id.
207 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77
(Fed. Cir. 1984); MPEP, supra note 71, § 2164.01.
208 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
209 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
210 Id.
211 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
212 See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03 (2012) (collecting cases).
213 The factors are interrelated.  For example, if the PHOSITA is really smart (factor
five), an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already knows or can easily figure
out (factors one and two).  Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
214 The technical substance of the disclosure lies at the heart of the enablement analy-
sis. See supra note 213.  The two factors are clustered together because working examples
are a form of guidance.  Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 621, 641–46 (2010).
215 One way to determine the requisite amount of teaching is to ask whether the tech-
nology is “unpredictable” or “predictable.” See supra notes 73, 75, and accompanying text.
216 This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as the Federal
Circuit has compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the claimed invention. See, e.g.,
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941–42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that
the district court properly determined the PHOSITA’s level of skill and did not err in
giving less weight to a witness who analyzed an issue using the wrong level of skill); AK
Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that where the
claims covered a Type 1 or a Type 2 aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a
Type 2 coating, the claims were nonenabled because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps
without undue experimentation).
217 Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. See supra note 206 and accompa-
nying text.
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criteria that do much to eliminate foresight bias and render the utility
requirement unnecessary.218
a. Setting a High Disclosure Threshold
The Wands factors can be manipulated to set a high disclosure thresh-
old, which can lead to a narrow patent scope.  The easiest way to do this is to
place a premium on actual experimental details describing work that has
been performed.  This type of disclosure lies at the core of technical publica-
tions because it provides the best form of teaching.219  In patent law, actual
experimental details or “working examples” (which correspond to the first
and second Wands factors) provide the best evidence of enablement.220
When operability is in doubt,221 they can provide objective proof that the
invention really works.222  And, very importantly, working examples are the
218 The operability prong of utility provides an excellent example.  It attempts to answer
the objective, technical question of whether an invention can actually achieve its intended
result.  Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1992).  Unfortunately, the question is often framed in subjective terms, such as whether a
PHOSITA would believe the truth of the inventor’s assertions. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d
1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  Indeed, history reveals that gauging operability often devolves
into a biased judgment about the subject matter irrespective of technical substance.
Seymore, supra note 47, at 1511–23.  To the extent that the justification for operability is to
serve a gatekeeping function, it is an unnecessary requirement because a robust enable-
ment analysis can effectively ferret out unworkable inventions. Id. at 1524–37.
219 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAY & BARBARA GASTEL, HOW TO WRITE AND PUBLISH A SCIENTIFIC
PAPER 61 (6th ed. 2006) (noting that disclosing the experimental methods is important
because the scientific community must adjudge the results reproducible before attaching
scientific merit to the work); ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF
RESEARCH 51 (2d ed. 2009) (“The ability of other investigators to replicate the experiments
by following the method in the published report is crucial to the advancement of
science.”).
220 Seymore, supra note 214, at 653; see also Bratislav Stankovic, The Use of Examples in
Patent Applications, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 10 (2006) (noting that in patent docu-
ments, the presence of working examples “facilitates, if not ensures, enablement of an
invention”).  But, as with other forms of enablement, the breadth of the teaching provided
in a working example must be commensurate with the claim scope sought. See supra note
205.  A teaching that lacks specificity or provides inadequate guidance will result in a nar-
row(ed) claim scope (Wands factor eight). BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 115.
221 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
222 For instance, working examples helped convince the Patent Office and the courts
that it is possible to successfully treat cancer. Compare In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 249–53
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (explaining that applicants’ invention relating to an alleged effective treat-
ment for cancer, which lacked specific tests, experiments, or clinical data, asserted incredi-
ble utility in the light of the knowledge of the art), with In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326–28
(C.C.P.A. 1980) (concluding that clinical tests, combined with the close structural similar-
ity of the claimed compounds with chemotherapeutics known in the art, would allow a
PHOSITA to accept the claimed utility), and In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (noting that treating cancer with chemical compounds “does not suggest an inher-
ently unbelievable undertaking or involve implausible scientific principles” because there
are “numerous successful chemotherapeutic agents”).
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best way to ensure that the public gets a “[more] readable and substantively
useful patent document.”223  For these reasons, some have argued that there
should be an across-the-board working example requirement in patent
law,224 except for inventions in which enablement is “so apparent as virtually
to jump off the page and slap [a PHOSITA] in the face.”225
b. Solving the Manson Problem
Recall that a major challenge for the post-World War II patent system is
how to assess utility for chemical and pharmaceutical inventions, particularly
those that have no therapeutic or non-research-based use at the time patent
protection is sought.226  The Manson Court imposed a heightened utility
threshold (the modern utility requirement) to render such compounds
unpatentable.227  At least from a disclosure standpoint, society loses under
this regime because it fosters secrecy, delays disclosure, and conceals valuable
technical information.228
The result would be very different under the proposed enablement-
based paradigm.  Consider the following hypothetical—loosely based on the
underlying facts in In re Joly discussed above.229  Suppose that in 2008 an
inventor at a drug company sought to patent a class of chemical
intermediates that can be used as building blocks for steroids that are similar
in chemical structure to known drugs.  The patent application includes a
generic claim that, by claiming a core chemical structure with an array of five
variables appended to it, encompasses thousands of compounds.230  As is typ-
ical in pharmaceutical cases, the claim is incredibly broad231—here because
it is possible to substitute each of the five variables appended to the core
223 Seymore, supra note 214, at 642.
224 See id. at 641–54; see also Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 68, at 156–58.
Professor Cotropia also advocates an actual reduction to practice requirement. See Christo-
pher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 120–22 (2009)
(proposing a framework wherein the Patent Office would defer examination until the
applicant submits evidence of actual implementation of the invention).
225 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456–57 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also Seymore, Heightened
Enablement, supra note 68, at 156 n.151.  Invoking a working example requirement proba-
bly falls within the Patent Office’s statutory authority. See Seymore, supra note 47, at 1506
n.82 (discussing the working model requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)); Seymore,
supra note 214, at 642 n.103 (same).
226 See supra subsection I.B.1.
227 See supra subsection I.B.2.
228 See infra Section III.A.
229 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see supra subsection I.B.2.
230 This style of claiming a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas,
where the substituents are recited in the claim language, is ubiquitous in the chemical and
pharmaceutical arts. See In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 719–20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (sanctioning
the practice); In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (same).
231 Applicants have an incentive “to obtain very broad claims for which an argument
can be made for patentability.” ANTHONY MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 98 (2001); see also BRAD-
LEY C. WRIGHT, DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 603 (2d. ed. 2013) (advis-
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structure with a variety of organic functional groups.232  The patent applica-
tion, however, only sets forth five compounds actually made (working exam-
ples).  These five compounds are closely related to each other because the
same variable (one of the five) is substituted in each.
After construing the claims, assessing the PHOSITA’s level of skill, and
evaluating the teaching provided in the patent application,233 the examiner
determines that the disclosure only teaches a PHOSITA how to make a nar-
rower subgenus of fifty compounds, not thousands.  As support for a prima
facie case of nonenablement for the broad genus, the examiner recognizes
that:
[R]eplacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often have
highly unpredictable results. . . . [E]ven a change as seemingly trivial as
replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl group . . . could
result in either a significant improvement or reduction in the activity of the
compound . . . .234
The point here is that a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result from a
few, closely related embodiments,235 across a broad genus in an unpredict-
able field like chemistry, with a reasonable expectation of success.236
Consequently, the examiner rejects the broad generic claim as prima
facie nonenabled because a PHOSITA would have to engage in undue exper-
imentation to figure out what works.237  The burden then shifts to the appli-
cant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the PHOSITA’s
knowledge, in combination with the teaching provided in the patent applica-
tion, can actually enable the full scope of the generic claim.238  In response,
the applicant argues that a well-trained organic chemist would know where to
look in the scientific literature to fill in the technical gaps.239  The examiner
determines that the proffered argument is insufficient to rebut the prima
ing drafters of chemical patent applications to provide adequate support for claims that
often covers billions of compounds).
232 A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule with specific chemical
properties that represents a potential reaction site in a compound, and thus determine a
molecule’s chemical reactivity. See generally RICHARD C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC
TRANSFORMATIONS (2d ed. 1999) (providing examples).
233 See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (discussing the factual inquiries
underlying the enablement analysis).
234 Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
235 An “embodiment” is a concrete form of an invention described in a patent applica-
tion or patent. See infra note 365.
236 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
237 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 192, at 848 (explaining why such a rejection is
proper).  There is a danger that embodiments not described either cannot be made or
may require experimentation that is unduly extensive.  PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus.
Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
238 See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (articulating the burden-
shifting framework).
239 Applicants often point to the much-cited statement that “a patent need not teach,
and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”  Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibo-
dies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see supra note 213.  However, that state-
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facie case because it is not “persuasive . . . [and] supported by suitable [evi-
dence] where necessary, that [a PHOSITA] would be able to make and use
the claimed invention using the application as a guide.”240
At this point, the applicant is unable or unwilling to produce the requi-
site evidence.  Accordingly, the applicant voluntarily cancels the broad
generic claim and pursues the narrower subgenus claim covering fifty com-
pounds.  The examiner allows that claim and the applicant ultimately gets a
much narrower patent—covering fifty compounds instead of thousands—than
that which would have issued under the current regime.241
This result is a win-win for the patent system and society.  Granting the
narrower patent fulfills the quid pro quo because the claim scope obtained is
commensurate with the disclosure provided.242  This limited scope should
allay concerns, a` la Manson,243 about the patentee creating “a monopoly of
knowledge”244 that could “block off whole areas of scientific development,
without compensating benefit to the public.”245  To the contrary, the public
would benefit under the proposed regime because in exchange for the pat-
ent it would get very useful knowledge—actual experimental details—as
opposed to less helpful forms of disclosure.246
c. How About Enablement’s “How To Use” Requirement?
Enablement requires that the applicant provide a disclosure that teaches
a PHOSITA both how to make and how to use the invention.247  The “use”
requirement of § 112, however, differs from the utility requirement of § 101.
Whereas the latter is often a subjective value judgment,248 it has been clear
from the early days of the patent system that the purpose of the § 112 use
requirement is simply to provide the PHOSITA with a meaningful disclosure.
To make this point in In re Nelson,249 Judge Rich quoted a nineteenth-century
patent treatise explaining the enablement requirement:
[I]t is necessary . . . that the invention shall so be described in the specifica-
tion, that . . . [a PHOSITA] may not only understand the invention, but be
able, by following the directions given in the specification, with the assis-
ment “is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure.”
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
240 MPEP, supra note 71, § 2164.05; see also In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223.
241 Since (1) the current patent laws do not require any actual experimentation in
order to obtain a patent and (2) the Patent Office does not have its own testing facilities,
applicants in the unpredictable arts are often very successful in obtaining broad claims
with dubious enablement.  Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 68, at 143–54; see
Seymore, supra note 214, at 628–32.
242 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
243 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); see supra subsection I.C.2.b.
244 Manson, 383 U.S. at 534; see also supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
245 Manson, 383 U.S. at 534 (footnote omitted).
246 Seymore, supra note 214, at 634–35.
247 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
248 See Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 2085.
249 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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tance of the drawings, to construct the machine or perform the process
which is the subject of the patent.250
Thus, § 112 is satisfied if the inventor describes how to use the invention
as broadly as it is claimed.  Requiring the patent applicant to provide working
examples would do just that.
But this does not mean that the how-to-use requirement of § 112(a)
should be used as a proxy for the § 101 utility requirement.  It is true that
under the current regime, an invention that lacks utility under § 101 fails to
satisfy the how-to-use prong of the enablement requirement of § 112(a) as a
matter of law.251  This makes sense when the § 101 problem is inoperability,
because if the invention cannot operate to achieve the intended result, then
it is impossible to enable a PHOSITA to use it.252  But one can certainly
enable an invention yet fall short of the current utility threshold.  The best
example is the factual scenario presented in Manson.253  To be sure, Manson
provided an enabling disclosure that taught a PHOSITA how to both make
the steroid at issue and how to use it to make other compounds.254
This last point reveals the paradoxical nature of the modern utility
requirement as it relates to disclosure.  An applicant can assuredly disclose an
invention that enables a PHOSITA to make and use the invention (like a
chemical compound), but can nevertheless fail to meet the § 101 utility
threshold because the subject matter is deemed to be a “mere research pro-
posal”255 or “simply an object of research.”256  Yet again, this shows that util-
ity has little to do with the invention’s ability to provide a cognizable benefit
to society.257
2. Ensuring Technical Merit Through Nonobviousness
A robust enablement analysis would do much to allay fears about grant-
ing patents on microscale building blocks.  Since the breadth of the disclo-
sure would tightly limit the scope of the patent, concerns about creating
unjustifiable roadblocks for future innovators would diminish.  But even if
250 WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 233–34 (New York, Gould,
Banks & Co. 1837), quoted in In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 181.
251 In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  But the converse is not true:
it is possible to invent something with utility yet still “fail[ ] so to describe it as to teach the
[PHOSITA] how to practice it.”  Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 644 (1871); see
also Paul M. Janicke, Patent Disclosure—Some Problems and Current Developments, 52 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 757, 768 (1970) (providing examples).
252 See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Process Control Corp. v.
HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If a patent claim fails to meet
the utility requirement because it is . . . [inoperative], then it also fails to meet the how-to-
use aspect of the enablement requirement.”).
253 See supra subsection I.B.2.
254 See In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 239 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  In evaluating Manson’s appli-
cation, the Patent Office never asserted nonenablement as grounds for unpatentability.
255 In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
256 Id.
257 See infra text accompanying note 277.
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enablement is satisfied, a fact-intensive evaluation of the building block’s
technical merit might suggest that a patent should not issue at all because the
potential benefit that society might derive from the invention and its disclo-
sure does not justify the costs of granting a patent.258  This is because the
claimed building block does not differ substantially from what is already
known.  In such a situation, the proper tool to screen patentability is nonobvi-
ousness, not utility.
a. Understanding Nonobviousness
The statutory requirement for nonobviousness, embodied in § 103(a) of
the Patent Act,259 helps fulfill the patent system’s broad policy goals of pro-
moting technological progress,260 coordinating the future development of
technology,261 and spurring innovation.262  By reserving the quid pro quo of
patent rights for inventions that represent a significant step forward in the
field, the nonobviousness requirement ensures that patents are only awarded
for those inventions (though novel and enabled)263 whose disclosures will
actually add to the storehouse of useful knowledge.264  Among other things,
258 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120
YALE L.J. 1590, 1594 (2011); see Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indetermi-
nate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 62
(2008) (“The nonobviousness requirement protects society against the social costs both of
denying a deserving patent and of granting an undeserving monopoly.”).
259 The statute provides in relevant part that
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to a [PHOSITA] to which the claimed invention
pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
260 See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949) (explaining that the patent portion of the
Intellectual Property Clause can be read to mean “[t]o promote the progress of technol-
ogy” or “[t]o accelerate technological progress”).
261 Kitch, supra note 137, at 266.
262 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
263 See 1 CHISUM, supra note 212, § 3.01 (noting that nonobviousness asks if an inven-
tion is “new enough” to warrant a patent); Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back
and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 1, 2 (Peter K. Yu
ed., 2007) (“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably
new . . . .”).
264 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent sys-
tem . . . .”); Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) (“The design of the patent laws is
to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our
knowledge . . . . It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling
device . . . .”); Kitch, supra note 137, at 283 (arguing that patents should not be granted for
the use and development of known technical information because “proper incentives for
its acquisition and use exist without a property right”).
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this induces inventors to explore more challenging, socially valuable projects
rather than pursuing trivial ones.265  As Professor Mark Lemley puts it, non-
obviousness “sets a minimum threshold social value the invention must con-
tribute in order to make it worth the trouble of issuing and enforcing a
patent.”266
Like enablement, nonobviousness is a standard.  It requires a compari-
son of the invention with the “prior art,” which refers to preexisting knowl-
edge and technology already available to the public.267  In Graham v. John
Deere Co.,268 the Supreme Court articulated the basic framework for deter-
mining nonobviousness.  It is a question of law based on the following perti-
nent underlying facts: (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art, (2)
the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the
PHOSITA’s level of skill, and (4) secondary considerations that provide
objective proof of nonobviousness, like the fact that the invention fulfilled a
long-felt but unsolved need.269
Thus, inventions that are sufficiently close to the prior art and within the
PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time of filing are unpatentable.270  This
essentially “creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the state of the art,”271
allowing the PHOSITA to substitute materials, streamline processes, and
265 Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
127, 137 (2000); see Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks:
A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (“The nonobviousness
threshold may be used as a ‘stick’ to induce researchers to pursue more difficult, socially
preferred research projects.”).
266 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1001 (1997); see Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1415, 1437 n.81 (1995) (“The nonobviousness requirement assures that the inven-
tor contributes something to society before she is granted a . . . right to exclude others
from making, selling, or using her invention.”).
267 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (defining the documents and activities that can serve as
prior art); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
268 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
269 Id. at 17–18.  Subsequent caselaw has established that a conclusion of obviousness
must be supported by clearly articulated reasoning.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) (explaining that, in addition to the Graham factors, “[r]ejections on obvi-
ousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must
be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal con-
clusion of obviousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006))); see also
MPEP, supra note 71, § 2141(III) (listing rationales that examiners can use to support a
conclusion of obviousness).
270 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 305 (2d ed. 2011).
271 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 288 (3d ed. 2009);
see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent
requirements for patent protection . . . assure that ideas in the public domain remain there
for the free use of the public.”).
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“[make] the usual marginal improvements which occur as a technology
matures.”272
b. Nonobviousness: The Proper Gatekeeper
The idea that nonobviousness is a more appropriate tool for evaluating
technical merit than utility finds support in one of the Federal Circuit’s most
powerful dissenting opinions.  In In re Fisher,273 the issue before the court was
the utility of short DNA sequences known as expressed sequence tags
(ESTs).274  Though the applicant asserted seven uses for the claimed ESTs,
the examiner made a § 101 rejection because: (1) the disclosed uses were
applicable to all ESTs and not specific to the those claimed, and (2) there
was no known use for the proteins produced from the claimed ESTs.275  Cit-
ing Manson, the majority affirmed the rejection because the claimed ESTs
were merely “research tools” that lacked specific and substantial utility.276  In
dissent, Judge Rader argued that ESTs—like microscopes, screening assays,
and nucleotide sequencing techniques—are research tools that “provide a
cognizable benefit to society.”277  But what is most important for present pur-
poses is that he argued that the utility rejection was improper:
In truth, I have some sympathy with the Patent Office’s dilemma.  [It]
needs some tool to reject inventions that may advance the “useful arts” but
not sufficiently to warrant the valuable exclusive right of a patent.  The Pat-
ent Office has seized upon this utility requirement to reject these research
tools as contributing “insubstantially” to the advance of the useful arts.  The
utility requirement is ill suited to that task, however, because it lacks any
standard for assessing the state of the prior art and the contributions of the
claimed advance. The proper tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the useful
arts is the [non]obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. . . . [R]ather than
distort the utility test, the Patent Office should seek ways to apply the correct
test . . . .278
As Professor Mark Janis recently noted, “Judge Rader’s Fisher dissent is a
powerful reminder of our longstanding commitment to obviousness as the
ultimate condition of patentability.”279
272 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 271, at 288; cf. Merges, supra note 63, at 14
(“[N]onobviousness is designed to maintain a penumbra around the stock of known
devices, techniques, etc., insuring that trivial extensions from what is known will not be
granted property rights.”).
273 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
274 Id. at 1367.
275 Id. at 1367–68.
276 Id. at 1369–76.
277 Id. at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 1381–82 (emphasis added).
279 Mark D. Janis, Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS
335, 340 (2012); cf. Merges, supra note 12, at 812 (describing nonobviousness as “the final
gatekeeper of the patent system”); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 771, 789 (2003) (describing nonobviousness as “[t]he fundamental gatekeeper
to patenting”).
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To illustrate how nonobviousness could effectively screen building block
inventions, consider again the hypothetical discussed above involving a new
class of chemical intermediates that can serve as building blocks for larger
compounds.280  Suppose the applicant has responded to the aforementioned
nonenablement rejection by narrowing the scope of the claims to a subgenus
of fifty compounds instead of the genus of thousands originally sought.
When the examiner compares the subgenus to the prior art,281 the search
reveals that the claimed compounds are novel but very similar to those dis-
closed in a 1998 book entitled Chemical Intermediates for Pharmaceuticals.  In
fact, the claimed compounds and those described in the book are all mem-
bers of the same chemical family (“homologs”),282 the only difference being
that a “methyl” group (one carbon) on the core structure of the prior art
compounds has been replaced with an “ethyl” group (two carbons) on the
core structure of the claimed compounds.283  Predictably, given the minimal
variation in structure, the claimed compounds are prepared by the same
methods, have similar physical properties, and undergo the very same chemi-
cal reactions (albeit slightly faster) as the prior art compounds.284
After making the factual findings set forth by the Supreme Court in Gra-
ham,285 the examiner concludes that it would have been obvious for a
PHOSITA at the time of the invention to make the claimed compounds.  The
examiner supports this conclusion with two rationales.  First, the claimed
compounds are a “straightforward, one-carbon extension”286 of a carbon
chain—a standard structural modification in organic chemistry.287  They
represent “[a] [s]imple substitution of one known [chemical functionality]
for another to obtain predictable results.”288  Accordingly, a PHOSITA would
have had a reasonable expectation of success in independently arriving at the
280 See supra text accompanying notes 229–41.
281 See supra text accompanying note 267.
282 “Homologues” refers to a family of chemical compounds, which vary from member
to member by a methylene (—CH2—) group. In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457, 458 n.7 (C.C.P.A.
1977); see also In re Coes, 173 F.2d 1012, 1013–14 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (“A homologous series
may therefore be defined as a family of chemically related compounds, the composition of
which varies from member to member by one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen.”
(quoting JULIUS B. COHEN, THEORETICAL ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 51 (3d ed. 1934))).
283 A methyl group (Me or —CH3) is the simplest carbon-containing function group in
organic chemistry.  An ethyl group (Et or —CH2H3) is the next simplest. THOMAS N. SOR-
RELL, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 20 (2d ed. 2006).
284 See COHEN, supra note 282, at 50 (noting that homologs undergo similar chemical
reactions); id. at 51 (“[T]he advantages of [homology] will now be obvious, for it will only
be necessary to describe the chemical characteristics of one member, when that of the
whole series of homologues may be inferred.”).
285 See supra text accompanying note 269.
286 K. PETER C. VOLLHARDT & NEIL E. SCHORE, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION 300 (4th ed. 2003) (describing a “homologation”).
287 See id.
288 MPEP, supra note 71, § 2143(I); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416
(2007) (“[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered
by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination
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claimed invention.289  Second and relatedly, Chemical Intermediates for
Pharmaceuticals and knowledge in the art “ ‘would have suggested making the
specific molecular modifications necessary to achieve the claimed inven-
tion’”290 because in this area of chemistry, ethyl derivatives are known and
expected to react slightly faster than the methyl derivatives.291  Thus, this is a
situation where a prior art compound “suggest[s] its homolog . . . because
such compounds often have similar properties[,] and therefore chemists of
ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain
compounds with improved properties.”292
Having made a prima facie case of unpatentability, the burden of going
forward shifts to the applicant.293  The applicant attempts to rebut the prima
facie case by arguing that the claimed compounds show an unexpected prop-
erty over the prior art;294 namely, that they react faster than a PHOSITA
would expect.295  In response, the examiner explains why the record sup-
ports the opposite conclusion: the evidence as a whole296 gives rise to a pre-
sumption that homologs that are structurally very close (“adjacent
homologue[s]”)297 will have similar properties.298  Of course, since the prior
art compounds and the claimed compounds are not identical, some differ-
must do more than yield a predictable result.” (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39,
50–51 (1966))).
289 See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (reaffirming “reasonable expectation of success” jurisprudence post-KSR); In re
O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Obviousness does not require absolute
predictability . . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.”).
290 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also Altana Pharma
AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]o establish a prima
facie case of obviousness in cases involving new chemical compounds, the accused
infringer must identify some reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known
compound in a particular manner.”).
291 See, e.g., SORRELL, supra note 283, at 148–49 (illustrating how the variation in reactiv-
ity of homologous compounds can be attributed to “inductive effects”—the differing ability
of methyl and ethyl groups to release electrons); Paul von Rague´ Schleyer & Curtis W.
Woodworth, Substituents and Bridgehead Carbonium Ion Reactivities.  Inductive and Steric Effects
of Alkyl Groups in Saturated Systems, 90 J. AM. CHEM. SOC’Y 6528, 6528–30 (1968) (exploring
the increased rate of reactivity across a homologous series).
292 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 995–96 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (quoting Takeda Chem., 492 F.3d at 1356–57) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
294 To prevail, the inventor must show “that the claimed invention exhibits some supe-
rior property or advantage that [a PHOSITA] would have found surprising or unex-
pected.” In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
295 See supra text accompanying note 284.
296 In considering rebuttal evidence, “[t]he ultimate determination of patentability
must be based on consideration of the entire record, by a preponderance of evidence, with
due consideration to the persuasiveness of any arguments and any secondary evidence.” 
MPEP, supra note 71, § 716.01(d).
297 In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457, 458 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
298 Id. at 461.
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ences in properties are expected to result.299  That the claimed compounds
react two to three times faster than the prior art compounds, however, is
expected because the properties of homologs show regularities of increase
(or decrease) across a series.300  The totality of the evidence shows that the
replacement of a methyl with an ethyl was within the capabilities of the
PHOSITA, and that the slight increase in reactivity did not “produce a new
and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree
from the results of the prior art.”301  Thus, the presumed expectation stands
unrebutted.  Lacking any additional evidence, the applicant decides to aban-
don the application.
That the patent is ultimately derailed in this scenario is good for the
patent system and very much in line with the goals of the proposal.  Even if
the building block is new and supported by an enabling disclosure, Graham
teaches that it “may still not be patentable if the difference between the new
thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to war-
rant a patent.”302  Making a class of homologs that are virtually identical to
the prior art in every respect is a routine endeavor and a mere trivial modifi-
cation to what is already known.  This means that the inventor could not pro-
vide a useful disclosure to society, because information about the homologs
would add nothing to the public storehouse of knowledge.303  At the time of
the invention, the homologs were well within the PHOSITA’s skill and tech-
nical grasp and would have arisen through ordinary technological pro-
gress.304  Indeed, organic chemists contemplate homologs all the time when
constructing compounds with desired properties.305
This hypothetical reveals that nonobviousness ultimately performs three
interrelated and important gatekeeping functions.  First, it protects (the
integrity of) the public storehouse of knowledge.306  Second, it maintains a
“patent-free zone” around the prior art, which allows researchers to tinker.307
Third, it “weed[s] out those inventions [that] would not be disclosed or
299 MPEP, supra note 71, § 716.02.
300 GEORGE FOWNES, A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY CHEMISTRY 395 (London, John Churc-
hill, 7th ed. 1858). See generally W.H. PERKIN & F. STANLEY KIPPING, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY
67–442 (1900) (discussing the properties of homologs).
301 In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955), quoted in Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA
Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091,
1099 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding prima facie obviousness was not overcome where the
alleged difference in properties between the claimed compound and the prior art com-
pound “is a matter of degree rather than kind”).
302 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at
7 (1952)).
303 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
304 Miller, supra note 263, at 2 (“It is socially wasteful for us to pay a patent-backed
premium for an innovation that we are almost certain to receive for free and just as early.”
(footnote omitted)).
305 See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text.
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devised but for the inducement of a patent.”308  But unlike utility, nonobvi-
ousness is determined through an objective, fact-intensive inquiry.
C. Whither Utility?
Allowing patents on microscale building blocks raises the question of
what to do about utility.  Since assessing utility necessarily involves foresight
bias,309 its role in patent law should be significantly diminished.  The previ-
ous Section shows that enablement and nonobviousness can effectively con-
strain patent scope and evaluate technical merit without § 101.  It is for these
reasons that the term “useful” should once again be given a de minimis inter-
pretation.310  This would essentially remove utility from the patentability
calculus.311
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Foresight bias arises in the microscale building block context out of the
fear that the patentee could substantially impede technological progress by
controlling access to the building block.  Indeed, some commentators have
argued that the utility standard of § 101 should be fortified to ensure that
microscale building blocks remain freely accessible.312  This Part responds to
concerns that the proposal might impede downstream research.  To the con-
trary, the proposal would not only represent a significant step forward in
resolving the law-science disconnect but also help fulfill broader goals of pat-
ent policy.
A. Disclosure over Secrecy
The quid pro quo rationale for patents is to incentivize the disclosure of
information that the public might not otherwise get.313  For the patentee,
the incentive for full public disclosure of the invention is the limited period
of exclusionary rights.314  For the public, the exchange serves the public
308 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
309 See supra text accompanying notes 28–47.
310 See supra subsection I.B.1.
311 It is possible to make additional, independent arguments that utility should be elim-
inated from patent law. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046,
1073–77 (2014) (arguing that subjectivity, indifference to the technical substance of the
disclosure, and superfluity make the utility requirement “substantively bankrupt”).
312 Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 299 (2003).
313 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 32, at 143.
314 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81 (describing the quid pro quo that supports
the patent grant as a constitutional objective).
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good because the disclosed information enriches the public storehouse of
technical knowledge once the patent document publishes.315
The patent system goes to great lengths to promote and safeguard the
disclosure function, which is regarded as “a centerpiece of patent policy.”316
The inventor’s early public disclosure is the ultimate goal317 because it facili-
tates commercialization, coordinates the development of technology,
reduces wasteful duplicative efforts by competitors, and dedicates the inven-
tion to the public at an earlier time.318  In fact, inventors who do not file
promptly compromise their patent rights.319
If disclosure is the centerpiece of patent policy, then secrecy is its antith-
esis.320  It would seem that any patentability requirement that fosters secrecy
315 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining that when the information disclosed in a pat-
ent becomes publicly available it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly
will stimulate ideas and promote technological development); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d
1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full and complete
disclosure of how to make and use the claimed invention “adds a measure of worthwhile
knowledge to the public storehouse”).  Patent documents include issued patents and pub-
lished patent applications.  Note that once a patent application publishes, the information
disclosed therein is considered known to the public even if it never matures into a patent.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
316 Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV.
2007, 2011 (2005); see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (explaining that the
patent system should be viewed as “a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”).
317 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.”).
318 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 445
(2004); Kitch, supra note 137, at 269–77.  Professor Pamela Samuelson explains:
Innovators who have a choice between trade secrecy and patent protection for,
say, a chemical discovery will thereby be making a choice between inaccessible
and accessible information.  Subsequent researchers may rediscover the same
compound or process, and competitors may eventually reverse engineer the
secret, but the issuance of a patent will disclose what that innovation is, how to
make it, how it differs from the prior art, [etc.]  This knowledge will thereby
become publicly accessible sooner and with less reduplication of effort than the
trade secret option would produce.
Pamela Samuelson, Lecture, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 829
(2006).
319 For example, an applicant must file a patent application within one year of disclos-
ing the invention in a printed publication.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).  A fundamental purpose
of § 102(b) is to encourage prompt filing.  Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148
F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
320 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 919 (2011) (“Pat-
ents are often conceptualized as a means of luring secret inventions out of the dark, shad-
owy cave of trade secrecy, and into the bright, public sunlight of the patent system.”); see
also Jason Mazzone & Matthew Moore, The Secret Life of Patents, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 35
(2008) (explaining how federal patent law “expresses a clear preference for the inventor
who discloses an invention to the public and obtains a patent over the inventor who keeps
the invention a secret”).
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should have no place in patent law.321  But the utility requirement of § 101—
as it applied to microscale building block inventions—does just that!  Con-
sider the hypothetical posed earlier: an inventor at AcmePharma who
invented X—a complex, hard-to-make, molecular knot that was useful as a
building block for larger compounds—was denied a patent for a lack of util-
ity.322  Recall that AcmePharma invested $1.6 billion in the project to find a
suitable replacement for Lipitor.  AcmePharma has every incentive to keep
the technical details about X secret unless and until it develops a Lipitor
replacement or some other drug.323
This outcome clearly frustrates fundamental goals of the patent system.
If a patent document never publishes, knowledge about X never enters the
public storehouse of knowledge.  Since patenting induces inventors to dis-
close technical information about the invention in forums outside of the pat-
ent system (like scientific publications),324 the public storehouse of
knowledge is even more deprived.  This increases the likelihood of wasteful
duplicative efforts of competitors as they try to figure out how to make X.325
There is another scenario that should give the patent system considera-
ble pause.326  Suppose AcmePharma decides to disclose X without an identi-
fiable end use.  Currently AcmePharma cannot obtain a patent because of a
lack of utility.327  But suppose that a second researcher discovers a use for X.
321 It is worth noting that certain provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA) might
encourage secrecy.  Most notably, AIA § 102(a)(1) can be interpreted to disqualify the
inventor’s secret commercial activities as prior art. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding
the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 54 (2012) (arguing
that the AIA repeals the forfeiture doctrine articulated in Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 519–20 (2d Cir. 1946)).  This interpretation would
allow inventors to practice their inventions as trade secrets indefinitely before obtaining a
patent unless and until someone else independently invents and discloses it.  Paul Morgan,
The Ambiguity in Section 102(a)(1) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O
PAT. L.J. 29, 31, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/12/morgan.2011.aia
ambiguities.pdf.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 53–60.
323 See Anderson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 817; cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,
538 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that an
inventor may make the “abstractly logical choice . . . to maintain secrecy until a product
use can be discovered”).
324 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 146 (2006)
(“An inventor who anticipates obtaining a patent on an invention will be more willing to
publish a scientific article or other sort of disclosure to the public, because she knows her
invention will eventually be protected by a patent and not by a trade secret.”); Jason
Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 21–37 (2012) (describing non-patent
invention disclosures).
325 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989); see also Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights
Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 982
(1977) (explaining that one of the costs of secrecy is “reinvention, which from society’s
viewpoint is a waste of money, time, and talent”).
326 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 230 (describing the problem).
327 See supra Section I.C.
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Unfortunately, the caselaw makes it crystal clear that the second researcher
also cannot obtain a patent on X because it has entered the public
domain.328  At best, the second researcher will have to settle for a much less
valuable patent on the specific use identified.329  Again, this might create an
incentive for one who invents a chemical to keep it secret while a use is
sought.330
Even if AcmePharma cannot make a Lipitor replacement, were X pat-
ented and licensed, one of AcmePharma’s licensees might have the creative
and technical skills to do so.  However, the public good is still served if that
never happens.  As soon as a patent document disclosing X publishes, there
is hope that the public will use the technical details disclosed therein to
improve upon X, to design around it, or to engage in other innovative activi-
ties.331  Although AcmePharma maintains the right to exclude others from
practicing X until the end of the patent term, “the technical information
disclosed in the patent document has potential immediate value to the pub-
lic, which can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe
upon the claims.”332  Again, this supports the patent system’s broader mis-
sion to promote technological progress and extend the frontiers of
knowledge.333
328 In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
329 In other words, the subsequent inventor can possibly obtain a “method of use” pat-
ent for X. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) (defining a patentable “process” to “include[ ] a
new use of a known . . . composition of matter, or material”); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a new use for a known
compound can be patented with a “method” claim).  There are, however, two principal
reasons why a “composition of matter claim” covering X is more valuable than those
directed to a specific “method of making” or “method of using” X.  First, compound claims
afford the broadest protection. See In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (dis-
cussing the “well-recognized advantages” of composition-of-matter claims); supra note 196
and accompanying text.  Second and relatedly, method patents are difficult to enforce
because the patentee “acquires only the right to preclude others from using the chemical
in the exact manner he has disclosed.”  Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Pat-
ents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 768, 781 (1969).  So the method patent might be too
narrow to cover other uses for X that come to the fore during its term.  Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005).
330 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 230; see supra note 323.
331 MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15–19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure
adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other creative individuals can use and
improve upon).
332 Seymore, supra note 214, at 624 (citing Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel
Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 9 at ¶ 77 (Hoffmann, L.J.)); see also Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 303 n.23 (2004) (“A patent application must disclose the nature of
the invention in detail, and although the public cannot practice the art during the period
of the patent, it can use the information disclosed in a variety of other ways.”).
333 This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innova-
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Nevertheless, concerns about secrecy are often downplayed because it is
assumed that the invention will be inevitably disclosed—either in a patent or
somewhere else.334  This is an empirical question that is hard to answer.335
Nonetheless, several points can be made.  First, many nonacademic patentees
choose not to disclose the technical details of their inventions outside of the
patent system.  Indeed, most information disclosed in a patent does not
appear in another medium.336  This is particularly true in industry, where
scientists publish relatively little.337  So, much technical information undis-
closed through the patent system never enters the public storehouse of
knowledge and will likely be lost.338
Second, some inventors concoct trivial uses simply to satisfy the utility
requirement.339  For example, AcmePharma might assert that X is a good
lubricant, detergent, or fuel just to get the compound patented.340  Judge
Rich believed that having to concoct utilities to meet the legal standard is a
poor expenditure of technical brainpower341 and wastes time and effort
tion, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system . . . .”); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws . . . is ‘to promote the
progress of science and useful arts . . . .’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
334 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting that concerns about
the virtues of disclosure and secrecy are “easily exaggerated”).
335 It is virtually impossible to find out how many inventors forego patenting altogether
because of a lack of utility.
336 Fromer, supra note 66, at 554; see also ESTEBAN BURRONE & GURIQBAL SINGH JAIYA,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) RIGHTS AND INNOVATION IN
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES para. 5, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation.pdf (“It has been estimated that pat-
ent documents contain 70% of the world’s accumulated technical knowledge and that
most of the information contained in patent documents is either never published else-
where or is first disclosed through the publication of the patent application.”).
337 See generally Benoıˆt Godin, Research and the Practice of Publication in Industries, 25 RES.
POL’Y 587 (1996) (presenting various explanations and using bibliometrics to assess the
usefulness of publication in industry).  The highest priority for an industrial inventor is to
generate results that show commercial promise and will ultimately find their way into a
marketable product.  Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Information Disclosure and the Eco-
nomics of Science and Technology, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY
519, 522 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987); see also Diana Hicks, Published Papers, Tacit Competen-
cies and Corporate Management of the Public/Private Character of Knowledge, 4 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 401, 413–14 (1995) (“After all, writing papers makes no money and consumes
time.”).
338 See Seymore, supra note 214, at 666 (discussing situations in which “the patent sys-
tem is the sole medium of disclosure”).
339 See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 960–61 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing such behavior); supra Section II.A.
340 See Anderson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 817 (“[W]here patent protection is impera-
tive, Kirk and Joly encourage the disclosure of trivial uses, developed only in an attempt to
satisfy the new judicial interpretation of the statute.”).
341 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 960–61 (Rich, J., dissenting).
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“which ought to be directed at a more worthy end.”342  It also frustrates the
disclosure function by filling the patent document (and ultimately the public
storehouse of knowledge) with unhelpful information.343
Third, even if the invention is ultimately patented after a suitable use is
found, the disclosure is inevitably delayed.344  In other words, the technical
information enters the public storehouse later rather than sooner.  Of
course, this conflicts directly with the patent system’s goal of promoting early
disclosure.345  Clearly concealment or delayed disclosure of otherwise new,
nonobvious, and enabled subject matter into the public storehouse hinders
innovation and frustrates basic goals of the patent system.
The approach proposed in this Article would alleviate these problems.
An inventor who invents a microscale building block that does not appear to
satisfy § 101 would no longer have a reason to keep the invention secret until
a suitable use is found.  Relatedly, there would be no need to concoct a trivial
use to satisfy the statute.  Rigorous enforcement of the enablement and non-
obviousness requirements could ensure that the public gets a disclosure that
adds robust technical information to the public storehouse of knowledge.346
B. Addressing Fears
It is fair to say that there is widespread belief that “too many patents are
granted on too many inventions.”347  Thus, any proposal that potentially
opens the doors of patentability goes against the grain of most academic
commentary and conventional thinking about patent reform.  In this Sec-
tion, I respond to concerns that implementing the proposal could potentially
slow, rather than promote, research and development activities.
1. The Anticommons Hypothesis
The principal rationale for limiting patents on “upstream” inventions
like microscale building blocks is that failing to do so would inhibit future
research and hinder “downstream” innovation.348  A specific concern is that
342 Id. at 961.
343 See Seymore, supra note 214, at 632 (criticizing disclosure practices which add no
technical value to the patent literature).
344 In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 924 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., dissenting).
345 See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text.
346 See infra Section III.B.
347 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 480 (2011).
348 For a general theoretical discussion, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 192, at
842–44, 894–908 (discussing how upstream patents can retard downstream innovation);
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30–32 (1991) (same).  Defining what constitutes “upstream” and
“downstream” research can be tricky depending on the nature of the research project.  But
in a general sense, the terms “upstream” and “downstream” are used “to identify the prox-
imity (temporal and conceptual) of particular research to a particular end product.”  Arti
K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and
Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 816 n.9 (2001).  Sometimes “upstream” is used as a
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“patents on research inputs may . . . impede upstream, noncommercial
research by creating an ‘anticommons’ in which rights holders may impose
excessive transaction costs or make the acquisition of licenses and other
rights too burdensome to permit the pursuit of scientifically and socially
worthwhile research.”349  When Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
articulated the anticommons hypothesis in 1998,350 they posited that the
phenomenon would impose significant costs in biotechnology—a field where
progress depends on the accessibility of (upstream) research inputs like pro-
teins and DNA fragments.351
If an anticommons exists in biotechnology, one should be able to look at
the field for evidence of its operation.  For instance, if research inputs have
been over-patented, one might expect that research and development (R&D)
activities would decrease because they would be more costly and difficult to
undertake.  The evidence, however, shows the exact opposite as R&D
expenditures, venture capital investment, and the number of industry per-
sonnel have increased since the time the anticommons effect was posited.352
Empirical inquiries into anticommons effects in biotechnology have
been unable to provide evidence that the patenting of research inputs is
adversely affecting innovation.  The inquiries include studies of datasets of
synonym for “basic” research, which consists of “systematic study directed toward fuller
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable
facts without specific applications towards processes or products in mind.” OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11: PREPARATION, SUB-
MISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET § 84, at 8 (2014).
349 John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE
2002, 2002 (2005).  A related concern is that those holding patents to research inputs “may
restrict follow-on research through the exercise of exclusivity.” Id.; cf. Katherine J.
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 81, 123 (“The concern with patented research tools arises from the fear that a
research tool may give the tool inventor the ability to block technological progress by con-
trolling the research that may be performed using the tool . . . .”).
350 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 (1998).
351 See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH)
WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS 5 (1998), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/re
search/fed/NIH/researchtools/Report98.htm (“The tools of the trade in biomedical
research and development are crucial for all bench scientists, and access to new tools has a
dramatic impact on the progress of research.”); see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 350,
at 699.
352 In 2007, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)—the world’s largest bio-
technology trade organization representing 1,100 members—released a whitepaper to
examine the anticommons from a theoretical and empirical basis. See TED BUCKLEY, THE
MYTH OF THE ANTICOMMONS (2007), available at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/
TheMythoftheAnticommons.pdf.  To summarize the results: the R&D expenditures of
R&D companies increased by over sixty percent from 1998 through 2005, the amount of
venture capital funding increased by 300% from 1995 through 2005, and the number of
industry employees increased by twenty-one percent from 1998 through 2005. Id. at 6–9.
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biotechnology patents353 and surveys of intellectual property attorneys, scien-
tists, and technology managers from academia and industry about the impact
of patents on their work.354  The authors of the surveys have explained that
the results fail to show that the hypothesized mechanism is operating:
Studies that have examined the incidence of access or anti-commons
problems find them, however, to be rare, even for industry scientists, and
especially so for academic scientists. . . . [A]lthough complaints about access
to patented technologies and findings are not rare . . . such limitations never
caused the academic scientists . . . to stop a promising line of research.
Finally, they find no evidence of academics being excluded from research
due to patents on research inputs . . . [and] virtually no instances of indus-
trial or academic researchers being stopped due to an inability to gain access
to a large number of patents needed for a research project.355
Indeed, some commentators have convincingly argued that patents can
actually promote R&D.356  Nonetheless, there are a host of reasons why an
353 See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) (finding, based on
dataset of 52,000 biotechnology patents from January 1990 through December 2004, that
there is “little evidence that the recent growth in biotechnology patenting is threatening
innovation”).
354 See John P. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property
in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL’Y 1184, 1185–86 (2007) [hereinafter Walsh et
al., Where Excludability Matters] (reporting on a survey of 507 academic biomedical research-
ers); John P. Walsh et al., supra note 349, at 2002–03 (reporting the findings from a survey
of 414 biotech researchers in academia, government, and nonprofit institutions); John P.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2003) [Walsh et al., Research Tools Patents] (reporting the findings from a survey of seventy
respondents which included intellectual property attorneys, scientists, and managers from
biotech firms, pharmaceutical firms, and university-based researchers).
355 Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Access—or Not—in Academic Biomedical Research,
in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 14–15 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010) (footnotes omitted).  Of course, the lack of enforcement can
contribute to this observation.  One particular result is worth highlighting.  A random sam-
ple of 381 academic researchers (including some doing drug development or other down-
stream work) revealed that only one percent reported having to delay or modify a project
because of a patent, yet none reported having to abandon a project because of a patent.
Walsh et al., supra note 349, at 2002.
356 See BUCKLEY, supra note 352, at 12 (“[B]iotechnology companies have stated not
only are patents not hurting them, but on the contrary the ability to patent is a prerequisite
for commercial success.”); Walsh et al., Research Tools Patents, supra note 354, at 289
(“[T]here is still ample reason—and recent scholarship—to suggest that patenting benefits
biomedical innovation, especially via its considerable impact on R&D incentives or via its
role in supporting an active market for technology.” (citation omitted)).  Some commenta-
tors have even argued that limiting patents on research tools could actually harm basic
science research by depriving it of the financial support that it needs. See Aaron S. Kes-
selheim & Jerry Avorn, University-Based Science and Biotechnology Products: Defining the Bounda-
ries of Intellectual Property, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 850, 852–53 (2005) (describing the decline
in public funding and the rise in private funding for basic science research).
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anticommons is not observed.357
One final point bears mention.  The lack of evidence to support an
anticommons hypothesis in biotechnology brings to light the disconnect
between patent law and science.358  Proponents of the hypothesis “either
ignore[d] the characteristics of the scientific commons altogether or base[d]
their views on questionable assumptions about it, such as the assumption that
upstream patents will inevitably restrict access to essential research tools for
which no alternatives exist.”359  Indeed, evidence suggests that such assump-
tions are mistaken.  A National Research Council study on patenting in bio-
technology found that academic scientists abandon or delay research projects
not because of overpatenting but for reasons that concern all academic scien-
tists—namely “lack of funding, conflict with other priorities, a judgment that
the project was not feasible, not scientifically important, or not that interest-
ing, and the perception that the field was too crowded with competing inves-
tigators.”360  All of this has led to a rethinking of the anticommons
hypothesis361 and its role in shaping patent policy.362
357 First, it is widely believed that academic researchers ignore patents. See Katherine J.
Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry
Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2250 (2009) (describing the “norm of ignoring pat-
ents” among scientists); Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 354, at 1189–90
(noting that the survey results reveal that academic scientists do not check for patents
before commencing research).  Industrial researchers might ignore patents because prac-
ticing an invention with knowledge of another’s valid patent could lead to a finding of
willful infringement (which includes increased damages).  Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Pat-
ents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21.  Second, many patent owners opt not to enforce their
patents against academic researchers because of the high costs of detecting infringement,
high litigation costs, and the low value of a potential lawsuit.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Non-
compliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2008).  Patentees may engage in this “rational forbearance” of
unlicensed use because “scientific norms still generate social pressure to share materials,
particularly with nonprofit entities.”  Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress
in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 677 (2004).  Third, sometimes the user takes a
license. See Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An
Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31, 31–39 (2006).  Fourth, researchers can
“design around” the patented technology. See infra notes 370–71 and accompanying text.
Fifth, a potential infringer may opt to challenge the patent.  Wesley M. Cohen & John P.
Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 12
(2007).
358 For additional commentary on the disconnect, see sources cited supra note 68.
359 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 353, at 1686; see F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 691, 702–04 (2001) (arguing that, contrary to the beliefs of the patent
critics, patents are essential to promoting the central norms of the basic biological research
community).
360 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC
RESEARCH 123 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006).
361 Eisenberg, supra note 357, at 1061–62 (describing the empirical studies which sug-
gest that the hypothesized anticommons effect in biotechnology has not materialized).
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2. Controlling the Development of Technology
At this point, it is necessary to address two additional concerns related to
the holder of a microscale building block patent to control the development
of technology.  First, it is not clear why microscale building blocks lacking a
specific or substantial utility at the time of filing363 would raise greater block-
ing concerns than those which pass the test.  For example, consider an inven-
tor who invents compound Y.  Having determined that a patent is
imperative, the inventor discloses a trivial use—that Y is useful as a fragrance
since it has a pleasant odor—to pass muster under § 101.  After the patent
issues, it is discovered that Y is a synthetic precursor to Z—the first com-
pound known to effectively regenerate human teeth.364  Though the patent
on Y will cover uses beyond those disclosed,365 that the patentee can play a
role in coordinating the future development of technology aligns with patent
theory.366  Nevertheless, the inventor’s decision of how (or if) to license the
patent for the emerging field of tooth regeneration has nothing to do with
the utility disclosed (Y’s fragrant properties) to get the patent.  This supports
the argument that utility is a superfluous patentability requirement that does
no real work.367
Second, granting a patent on a microscale building block need not—
and probably will not—block off an entire field of research and create a uni-
tary monopoly.368  To begin, a patentee can exercise significant control over
research progress only if there are no close substitutes for the building block
362 See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 985, 1029 (2005) (observing that in biotechnology the anticommons effect has
not been confirmed by empirical studies and that the patenting of research tools “has not
conformed as predicted” by theorists).
363 See discussion supra Section I.C.
364 See, e.g., Kazuhisa Nakao et al., The Development of a Bioengineered Organ Germ Method,
4 NATURE METHODS 227, 227–30 (2007) (describing a technique where researchers grew a
budding tooth in a Petri dish and then transplanted it into the an empty cavity in a
mouse’s mouth, where it grew to full size); Zunyi Zhang et al., Antagonistic Actions of Msx1
and Osr2 Pattern Mammalian Teeth into a Single Row, 323 SCIENCE 1232, 1232–34 (2009)
(reporting that deleting a specific gene in mice led them to grow extra teeth).  Both
groups believe that their findings will help elucidate how nature makes teeth and, eventu-
ally, lead to tooth regeneration in humans.
365 As Professor Robin Feldman has explained, “Once the inventor identifies a single
use for the product, the inventor may exclude others from the full spectrum of the prod-
uct, including any use of the product and other embodiments of the product.  Thus, one
embodiment provides an inventor with a broad range of rights.”  Robin Feldman, Rethink-
ing Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (footnote omitted); see supra notes
195–96 and accompanying text.  An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an
invention described in a patent application or patent. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at
27.
366 See Kitch, supra note 137, at 276–77 (discussing the prospect theory of patents);
supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
367 See supra Section II.C.
368 Lawrence R. Velvel, A Critique of Brenner vs. Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 10
(1967).
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and there are no close substitutes for research projects that require the build-
ing block.369  In addition, other inventors can certainly design around the
claimed building block and hopefully invent a better one.370  This is a posi-
tive result for the patent system, which in fact encourages such behavior.371
Although the patentee can exclude others from practicing the invention
until the patent term expires, there is hope that the patent will foster innova-
tion by inducing others to design around the invention and make new prod-
ucts and processes.372  Designing around an invention lies at the heart of
competition and ultimately benefits the public.373
C. Fostering and Rewarding Invention
The Supreme Court has emphasized that two fundamental policy objec-
tives of the patent system are to foster and reward invention and to promote
the disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation.374  The reward,
of course, is the exclusionary right conferred by the patent grant.375  The
goals are related: the reward of a patent encourages inventors to invent376
and publicly disclose377 the technical details of the invention rather than
keeping them as a trade secret.378
A starting point for fostering and rewarding invention is to eliminate
obstacles that discourage applicants from entering the patent system in the
369 Strandburg, supra note 349, at 124 (citing Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001)).
370 However, the lack of a robust experimental use defense in patent law impinges on
design-around opportunities and thus the teaching function of the patent disclosure.  Hol-
brook, supra note 324, at 140 (“One can read the patent but cannot make or use the
invention for purposes of exploring its function or the manner in which it works.”).
371 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
372 Id.
373 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235–36 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
374 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citing Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974)).
375 Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).  For a discussion of the “long intellec-
tual history” of the reward theory of patent law and arguments for and against it, see Mark
F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 310–14
(1992).
376 Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72,
122 (2012) (“[T]he ex ante ‘incentive to invent’ theory of patent law suggests that the
promise of patent protection will induce would-be innovators to engage in the inventive
enterprise because they know they will be able to recoup their sunk, fixed research and
development (R&D) costs over the lifetime of the patent by exploiting the patent’s exclu-
sionary power.”).
377 Eisenberg, supra note 325, at 1028 (“The incentive to disclose argument . . . rests on
the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep their inventions
secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them.”).
378 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); see
Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 258, at 1622 (“[T]rade secrecy protection can theoreti-
cally provide even more powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are
potentially infinite in duration.”); supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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first place.  The modern utility requirement is one such obstacle—at least for
those who seek patents on chemicals, seemingly impossible inventions, para-
digm-shifting inventions, and inventions emerging from nascent technolo-
gies.  All inventors want to believe that they will get—and are, in fact, entitled
to—a fair shot at getting a patent.  But if potential applicants believe that the
Patent Office and the courts are biased against granting patents for certain
types of inventions (which is likely given the subjective nature of the utility
requirement), they may decide not to waste their time and money pursuing a
patent if a denial is inevitable.  Put simply, “[i]nventors [r]espond to [h]ow
the Patent Office [b]ehaves.”379
The proposal shifts this paradigm.  An inventor who knows that a build-
ing block invention will receive an objective, fact-based examination might
decide to seek a patent.  In other words, the proposed regime’s elimination
of foresight bias might attract inventors to the patent system who currently
forego patenting because of § 101.  This would be a win-win-win for the pat-
entee, society, and the patent system.380
CONCLUSION
Foresight bias has no place in patent law.  It is nearly impossible to pre-
dict how a patentee might behave (with regard to licensing the technology or
enforcing the patent) or whether technological progress will be stalled if a
patent is granted on a building block.  Empirical inquiries into anticommons
effects suggest that the hypothesized negative effects of upstream patents on
downstream research have not materialized.  This has led to a rethinking of
the anticommons hypothesis and its role in shaping patent policy.
Foresight bias is an artifact of the patent system’s struggle to adjust to an
evolving invention landscape.  A problem of scale exists in patent law that
leads decision-makers to fear things that they cannot see, let alone under-
stand.  Indeed, the unpredictable nature of fields like chemistry and biotech-
nology—the attribute that fuels research, creates new possibilities, leads to
paradigm shifts, and does other things that the patent system seeks to pro-
mote—is what fuels foresight bias.381  But this can be fixed.  Evaluating build-
ing block inventions objectively and eviscerating the utility requirement will
do just that.  Implementing this proposal will promote disclosure, foster
more creative activity, and reduce wasteful duplicative research efforts—all
important objectives of the patent system.  Finally, eliminating the bias will
reconnect the patent system with many of the technical communities that it
serves.
379 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 175.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 65–67.
381 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (“[T]he inventions most benefit-
ing mankind are those that ‘push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like.’”
(quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring))).  Such inventions align with the purposes and “core con-
cept[s]” of patent law. Id. at 315–16.
